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Abstract
We analyze a game in strategic form, where each player’s payoff depends on his action and
his social status, which is given by his rank in the actions distribution. Our focus is on the re-
lation between the degree of heterogeneity among status-seeking players and the distribution of
their Nash equilibrium actions. We find that if among players intrinsic concerns are sufficiently
important relative to status concerns, individual equilibrium actions diverge, but if status concerns
are relatively important, individual equilibrium actions are the same. Another key result of the
analysis is that, in contrast to what is usually claimed, status seeking need not always be socially
inefficient. If players are sufficiently heterogeneous, there exists a Nash equilibrium that is unique,
separating, and Pareto efficient.
KEYWORDS: social status, heterogeneity, Pareto efficiency, game in strategic form, discontinu-
ous payoff function, Nash equilibrium
∗We are grateful to the editor of this journal and two referees for very helpful comments.
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, a new literature on modelling consumer behaviour has emer-
ged that stresses the links between individual choices. One series of studies explores
the notion that, in many areas, individuals care for their relative position in the con-
sumption or income hierarchy. It brings forward a diversity of results that chal-
lenge orthodox economic thinking, such as the relativity of economic growth for
happiness (Hirsch, 1976, Easterlin, 2001, Layard, 2005), the tendency to overcon-
sume and to neglect saving (Duesenberry, 1949, Frank, 1985b, Corneo and Jeanne,
1998), and the formation of class structure (Bernheim, 1994, Akerlof, 1997, Oxoby,
2004).1 Although an innate desire for relative position, or status, is seen by some
economists as inconsistent with rational self-interest, most agree that having high
relative standing is often instrumental in achieving absolute goals.2 Thus relative
position may be an important argument in the reduced-form utility function.
This paper addresses an elementary question that, to some surprise, has not
been analyzed thoroughly. It is concerned with the relation between the heterogene-
ity of status-seeking individuals and the distribution of their actions. For example, if
consumers differ only with respect to income: what is the relationship between the
income distribution and the distribution of status consumption goods? The prob-
lem is essentially game-theoretic. When every person’s utility depends on how his
action compares with the actions of other people, the choice of action becomes
strategic, because everyone must anticipate the behaviour of the others in making
his optimal decision. Here the literature usually assumes that each person chooses
his optimal action, given the actions of all the others. For answering our question,
it is therefore natural to resort to Nash equilibrium analysis.
The role of heterogeneity in situations where relative position matters re-
quires to be more fully elucidated. Many studies that deal with the status seeking
phenomenon bypass the role of heterogeneity by assuming that all individuals are
identical (e.g., Congleton, 1989, Akerlof, 1997, Eaton and Eswaran, 2009). Studies
that do assume individual differences often follow a partial-equilibrium approach
(e.g., Layard, 1980, Congleton, 1989, Clark and Oswald, 1998), and thus run the
1A classic is Veblen (1899), though the interest in relative position has an even longer history
in economics (see, e.g., Mason, 1998). More formal analyses appear with Morgenstern (1948),
Duesenberry (1949) and Leibenstein (1950). For empirical evidence, see, e.g., Ball, Eckel, Gross-
man, and Zame (2001), Layard (1980), and Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell (2009). Probably the most
comprehensive study is Frank’s Choosing the Right Pond (1985a).
2For example, higher relative standing may give access to better jobs and education. Frank
(1985a) gives evidence of both innate desires for status and status-dependent opportunities (see also
Hirsch, 1976, and Konrad, 1990). Postlewaite (1998) provides a methodological discussion on this
point (see also Rayo and Becker, 2008).
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risk that the generated distribution of actions differs from the hypothesized distri-
bution upon which individuals base their actions. Moreover, they tend to ignore the
possibility of multiple equilibrium distributions. Sometimes the presumption that a
unique equilibrium exists is warranted, such as when a so-called cardinal measure
of status is employed that accounts for the actions of other people by taking simply
their arithmetic mean. In principle, we then have an aggregative game, which under
general conditions guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium (Corcho´n,
2001). No such precise existence and uniqueness results are available, however, for
the case where status is ordinally measured by a person’s rank in the consumption
hierarchy. This is a problem because some studies suggest that social comparisons
are more ordinal than cardinal (see Brown, Gardner, Oswald, and Qian, 2008, Clark,
Masclet, and Villeval, 2006).
In this paper, we will examine a simple non-cooperative game in strategic
form, where each player has a reduced payoff function with two arguments: his
action and his social status. The latter is ordinally measured by way of a cumulative
distribution function, i.e., a player’s status is determined by the fraction of players
who take an equal or lower social action than him. Differences among players may
induce Nash equilibria with a distribution of actions and thus a distribution of social
ranks, and the question is how this relationship exactly looks like. The distributions
of social ranks can be considered as equilibrium social ladders or equilibrium social
hierarchies.
The game is most close to the seminal article of Frank (1985b), and also
relates to the more recent contributions of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Becker,
Murphy, and Werning (2005), and Ray, Robson, and Xia (2008), among others.
However, we take a separate road in two respects. First, we give up the heuristic
assumption of a continuous distribution of individual (preference or income) char-
acteristics and thus an uncountably infinite number of agents. As cogently argued
by Frank (1985a), people’s sensitivity to social rank is particularly relevant in small
local environments (e.g., among friends, relatives, colleagues, club members, or
neighbours).3 This implies that in many situations the size of a person’s reference
group is essentially limited. Moreover, the continuity assumption becomes critical
when it tends to drive the results. This is illustrated by our finding reported below
that equilibria with status seeking may be Pareto efficient. Second, our aim is to
investigate the nature of all equilibrium distributions of actions. Studies that use
an ordinal measure of status tend to focus on equilibria that show a strictly positive
3Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) find strong evidence that, because of relative income concerns,
women’s decisions to work are positively related to their sisters’ employment decisions. Specifically,
women whose sisters were employed in the previous year are about 10 to 15 percent more likely to
work than those whose sisters did not work, for sisters living near by to one another.
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sorting of agents, where an agent’s social ranking remains the same as in the un-
derlying distribution of individual characteristics. Those that measure status with
a cumulative distribution function, such as Frank (1985b) and Becker et al. (2005),
ignore that the generated equilibrium distribution of actions is generally not unique.
In particular, there may exist equilibria that do not exhibit strictly positive sorting.4
Allocating the players to homogeneity classes, we identify two types of
Nash equilibria. Borrowing the terminology of signalling games (but note that
our game assumes complete information), we identify separating equilibria, where
members of different classes take different actions, and pooling equilibria, where
the members of two or more classes take the same action. Whereas the literature
focuses on separating equilibria, it is the finding of pooling equilibria that is, in our
view, really special. It is at odds with much of the economic literature on status
seeking, and even more so with the standard economic model. Where the latter typ-
ically implies that people with divergent preferences or opportunities act differently,
we find that – if they care for status and are able to alter it – people may actually
choose to do the same thing. Perhaps this is indeed the typical manifestation of
status seeking: people imitating the status consumption pattern of those with higher
incomes.5 It anyhow agrees with basic sociological notions that emphasize the uni-
formity of human behaviour. We will moreover show that pooling behaviour only
arises if the underlying differences among people are small. In this sense, the ex-
istence of pooling equilibria reconstructs basic elements from both economics and
sociology.
Our results on pooling equilibria show considerable similarities with Bern-
heim’s (1994) theory of conformity. For example, also he demonstrates that if status
concerns are relatively important, many individuals choose to conform to a uniform
standard, despite underlying differences in intrinsic utility, while individuals with
extreme intrinsic preferences will violate this standard. Just as in the current pa-
per, conformity is produced endogenously, and not based on some explicit ex ante
motive that people wish to conform to other people’s actions (cf. Jones, 1984, Ak-
erlof, 1980, 1997). However, there are important differences in basic assumptions.
Bernheim assumes that a person’s status depends on public perceptions about his
unobservable qualities, and that these qualities can be signalled by the person’s ac-
tions. The tendency to conform lies in the assumption that people who are believed
to have modal qualities are rewarded with higher status than people who are per-
4For example, it can be shown that an equilibrium exists where all (heterogeneous) agents take
the same action (see Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004, note 17). An analogue of this result is Theorem 8
below.
5The similarity between a separating equilibrium and the typical equilibrium that arises in the
absence of status seeking indeed poses the question how, without knowledge about ex-ante motives,
the presence of status seeking can be empirically identified.
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ceived to have extremely low or high qualities. In the current paper we bypass the
signalling role by simply assuming that a person’s action affects his status directly.
Here the tendency to conform lies in the assumption that people do not want to
fall behind in consumption, but also do not want to go ahead of everyone else. So
implicit is the suggestion of a standard of consumption to which all people want to
conform to, viz. the highest consumption level in the reference group. It is impor-
tant to emphasize, however, that pooling equilibria do not always exist. Also, if a
pooling equilibrium exists, it does not necessarily show a standard of consumption
that coincides with the highest consumption level. Even more than one consumption
standard can obtain, suggesting a parallel with Bernheim’s explanation of multiple
subcultures, each with its own distinct norm.
A major reason why economists are interested in the phenomenon of status
seeking arises from the claim that it is not socially efficient. If the actions of people
are motivated by social comparisons, the resulting equilibrium will be inherently
sub-optimal because people ignore the externalities their actions create with respect
to the relative standings of others. As a potential correction for the externality,
some authors have considered consumption taxes, income distribution policies, and
institutional reforms (Layard, 1980, 2005, Frank, 1985a, 2005, Hopkins and Ko-
rnienko, 2004). Nevertheless, in some circumstances, status seeking can be welfare
enhancing. First of all, the externalities of status seeking are not always limited to
the members of the reference group. Congleton (1989) indicates that status seek-
ing activities may harm but also benefit individuals who are not actively involved.
An example is a marathon race that produces entertainment for spectators. Second,
status seeking may reduce inefficiencies that are caused by market imperfections or
distortions. Weiss and Fershtman (1998) argue that if status is obtained through ed-
ucation, it may enhance efficiency when there is underinvestment in human capital
because of externalities or monitoring problems. The current paper contributes to
this literature and finds that, even in the absence of these spillover effects, the as-
serted inefficiency of status seeking does not hold in a number of important cases.
For example, if consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous, which is not unlikely
if their reference group is relatively small, there exists a Nash equilibrium that is
unique, separating, and Pareto efficient. Although establishing the efficiency of
equilibria requires an extensive technical exposition because of combinatorial as-
pects, the intuition for this result is straightforward. By dropping the continuity
assumption, the possibility arises that a consumer can alter his action without sur-
passing any other higher-ranked individual and thus without improving his social
status, so that the costs of changing his action beyond the socially optimal level
may be prohibitive. Nonetheless we also find that pooling equilibria are generally
not Pareto efficient.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 starts with some
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background for our modelling of social status and then specifies the status game
and introduces the basic assumptions, definitions, and terminology. Section 3 stud-
ies the status game with only two players. This limited setting already exhibits
a number of features that characterize the general case of an arbitrary number of
players. Sections 4 and 5 contain the central results of the paper. Section 4 studies
the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, Section 5 deals with the question
of Pareto efficiency. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the longer proofs
and Appendix B an addendum.
2 An ordinal status game
2.1 Introduction
Consider this simple setting with status seeking. Person i chooses a single observ-
able non-negative action xi of some economic or social kind to maximize (reduced-
form) utility:
ui(xi, si) (1)
given a status production function:
si = S i(xi; xıˆ) (2)
where si refers to his social status and xıˆ is the vector of actions of all other people.
Utility is influenced directly as well as indirectly. Loosely speaking, the action
yields the normal intrinsic benefits and, via the status production function, it also
generates status by establishing a certain position in the social hierarchy. People
may differ in their subjective valuation of intrinsic gains and social status.6 As
usual in this literature, each person chooses his utility-maximizing action, given the
actions of all the others.
The status production functions need, of course, further specification. Just
to fix ideas, let us suppose that status is earned by higher rather than lower actions.
To capture the phenomenon of status seeking, at least in an ex ante sense, it is then
natural to require that S i(xi; xıˆ) is increasing in xi and decreasing in each component
of xıˆ. Thus, if person i increases his action or if one or more others decrease their
actions, he may move upward in the social hierarchy and acquire more status. One
6The precise shape of a person’s status production function is exogenous for him; in reality,
what gains status and by how much are the collective product of people’s social valuations of each
other. Although someone may try to change his preference for status, perhaps by psycho therapy,
he is not able to change the collectively determined status production function (unless he is seen as
trendsetter).
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additional assumption is often implicitly made for convenience, although it is not
unrealistic: S i(xi; xıˆ) = S j(x j; x ˆ) if xi = x j. So, two people i and j have the same
status if they take the same action. It implies that the impact of other people is
independent of who does what, so everyone is of equal social importance.
At this point, the formal literature takes two different paths with respect to
the measurement of status. A ‘cardinal’ measure of status is employed by studies
that relate individual actions to some standard, often an average of other people’s
actions.7 It agrees with the idea that status depends on a linear combination of the
social differences xi − x j, or on a multiplicative combination of the social ratio’s
xi/x j. For example, the status of person i is continuous and strictly increasing in∑
j(xi − x j) and thus also in xi − xıˆ, where xıˆ is the arithmetic mean of the actions of
the others.8
Relating individual actions to some average action, as in the example, has
three features. First, moving closer to the action of a higher-status person, without
matching his action, still raises one’s status. Second, whether or not to match or to
surpass the action of a higher-status person is a marginal decision. And third, the
spread of other people’s actions around the average plays no role. Particularly the
last two features maybe are too special. In small local environments, where people
tend to engage in face-to-face contacts and have a name, a person who surpasses
someone else probably experiences a jump rather than a marginal increase in his
social status. The status production function is then discontinuous in xi at each
component of the vector xıˆ. The third characteristic produces the outcome that the
gain in status for a person who raises his action is independent of the number of
people he outstrips. For suppose that, in the preceding example, person i increases
his action from xıˆ to xıˆ + 2. If he goes from (say) 10 to 12, his gain in case one
half of the others chooses 5 and the other half 15, is exactly the same as in case one
half of the others chooses 9 and the other half 11. However, in the latter case he
surpasses one half of the people and even leaves everybody behind.
These peculiarities are avoided when status is measured in an ‘ordinal’ way.
Status seeking is then like racing: the winner has only to be faster than the person
coming in second; nothing is gained by increasing his lead. An ordinal measure is
perhaps closer to the sociological literature, where status generally refers to rank-
ordered relationships among people, as exemplified by the metaphor ‘social ladder’
(see, e.g., Ridgeway and Walker, 1995). Also some economic research suggests
that social comparisons are more ordinal than cardinal (see Brown et al., 2008,
7Examples are Duesenberry (1949), Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard (1980), Congleton
(1989), Clark and Oswald (1998), Oxoby (2004), and Arrow and Dasgupta (2009).
8This approach leads to (Cournot-like) aggregative games, for which there are well-established
results about existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria (see, e.g., Corcho´n, 2001). Also note that
a similar example for the social ratio’s xi/x j uses the geometric mean.
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Clark et al., 2006). Anyhow, studies that follow this path relate individual actions to
the cumulative distribution of other people’s actions.9 Transposing Frank’s seminal
specification of status to a discrete setting, the status of person i depends positively
on the fraction of people with lower or equal actions:
#{ j , i | x j ≤ xi}
N − 1 (3)
where # means ‘the number of elements of’ and N is the total number of people.
An alternative way of seeing this is that, since leaving more people behind means
fewer of them in front, a person’s status depends negatively on the fraction of people
with strictly higher actions. This view agrees with that people tend to look upward
when making comparisons, as suggested by, for example, the concept of (egoistic)
relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966) and the welfare-economic notion of envy
(Varian, 1974).
The paper examines the maximization of (1) with status si given by (3).
It should be emphasized that this modelling of status captures the phenomenon
of status seeking only in part, because it also includes a motive to conform. To
see this, note that, according to (3), everyone strives for a first place in the social
hierarchy, but an equal first place yields just as much status as a uniquely first place.
Now suppose that some person who is first but not uniquely first raises his action
(other things equal). The status of the other people he now surpasses will fall,
but the status of himself will not rise. The total amount of status to be distributed
among people therefore is not fixed, so (3) misses a common feature of status-
seeking behaviour.10 That the status of the person himself will not rise, actually
suggests a standard of action to which all people have to conform to, viz. the highest
9Examples are Layard, 1980, Frank, 1985b, Robson, 1992, Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004,
Becker et al., 2005, Ray et al., 2008, and Friedman and Ostrov, 2008. All these studies assume
an infinite number of agents, whose characteristics are continuously distributed.
10Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) deal with this problem by letting status also depend on the
fraction of people with lower actions (see also Robson, 1992). Transposed to our discrete setting,
their specification essentially comes to
(1 − θ)#{ j , i | x
j ≤ xi}
N − 1 + θ
#{ j , i | x j < xi}
N − 1
with 0 < θ ≤ 1. Unfortunately this formulation of status is problematic. In Appendix B it is shown
that, under general conditions, each (interior) Nash equilibrium has as many action levels as there
are agents. The reason is that if two or more people would take the same level of action, each of
them would have an incentive to increase his action infinitesimally to attain a discretely higher status
position. One consequence is that if intrinsical actions (see Subection 2.2) are status independent,
there does not exist a (interior) Nash equilibrium if at least two players are identical (i.e. have the
same reduced form utility).
7
Haagsma and van Mouche: Equilibrium Social Hierarchies
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
action level among the people. To save their reputation, people do not want to fall
behind this standard, nor do they want to go ahead of this standard. This conformist
element creates the possibility of pooling equilibria. However, we will show that
if a pooling equilibrium exists, it does not necessarily show this top standard. One
or more lower standards of action may appear as well, all this depending on the
underlying distribution of individual preferences and opportunities.
It is clear that different formulations of status, be it cardinal or ordinal, tend
to produce different outcomes (see, e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1998, Bilancini and
Boncinelli, 2008), and that which specification of status is most appropriate is ulti-
mately an empirical question. By studying the implications of (3), the contribution
of this paper can therefore be only a modest one. Having said that, our findings on
pooling equilibria show considerable similarities with Bernheim’s (1994) theory of
conformity and, more generally, reconstruct basic elements from both economics
and sociology (see Introduction). In the remainder of this section, we start with the
basic assumptions, definitions, and terminology of the game, and then derive some
preliminary results that will prove useful in the subsequent analysis.
2.2 The game
For a given integer N ≥ 2, let
N := {1, . . . ,N}
be the set of players and
Q := {q1, . . . , qN},
with qk := k−1N−1 (k ∈ N), the domain of the status variable. The foregoing suggests
the following non-cooperative game:
Definition 1 An (ordinal) status game is a game in strategic form with N ≥ 2
players where each player i ∈ N has
• action set Xi := [0, Li], where Li > 0; and
• a payoff function vi : X→ R given by
vi(x) := ui(xi,
#{ j ∈ N\{i} | x j ≤ xi}
N − 1 ), (4)
where X : = X1 × · · · × XN and the function ui : Xi × Q → R is continuous
in the first variable, strictly quasi-concave in the first variable, and strictly
increasing in the second variable. Moreover, the function ui is such that
max ui(·, 0) > ui(Li, 1).  (5)
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Note that the assumptions of the game are quite general and, in particular, do not
require that ui is differentiable in the action variable (the first one). Also, the status
variable (the second one) is discrete: given the actions of the others, a higher action
of player i that matches or surpasses the action level of one or more other players
raises his status level (with a jump). Condition (5) seems special, but it is only
included to make the game economically more interesting. Before showing this,
we introduce two basic functions of our analysis.
For each s ∈ Q, let xˆi(s) denote the unique maximizer of the function ui(·, s).
This xˆi(s) can be regarded as the action that maximizes intrinsic utility, in the sense
that this is what player i would do if his status were exogenously fixed at level s
(e.g., given by his rank in the income distribution). xˆi(s) will be called his intrinsic
action (at s) for short.
The second basic function is defined as follows. Given a, b ∈ Q with a ≤
b, condition (5) guarantees for player i ∈ N the existence of a unique xi(b, a) ∈
[xˆi(b), Li] such that11
ui(xi(b, a), b) = ui(xˆi(a), a).
Function xi is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that xi(a, a) = xˆi(a).
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Li
xi
ui
ui(·, b)
ui(·, a)
xˆi(a) xˆi(b) x¯i(b, a)
Figure 1: Determination of xi.
11To see that xi is well-defined, note that, by virtue of (5), ui(Li, b) ≤ ui(Li, 1) < ui(xˆi(0), 0) ≤
ui(xˆi(a), a) ≤ ui(xˆi(b), b) and that ui(·, b) is continuous and strictly decreasing on [xˆi(b), Li].
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To clarify the role of condition (5), note first that max ui(·, 0) = ui(xˆi(0), 0) =
ui(xi(1, 0), 1). Then the condition implies xˆi(s) < xi(1, 0) < Li.12 It follows that, for
each status level s, the function ui(·, s) is strictly increasing on the segment [0, xˆi(s)]
and strictly decreasing on the non-degenerate segment [xˆi(s), xi(1, 0)]. Now, hold-
ing the actions of the others constant, suppose player i increases his action from x
to x′ > x, improving his status level from s to s′ ≥ s. The change in payoff follows
as ui(x′, s′) − ui(x, s) = [ui(x′, s′) − ui(x′, s)] + [ui(x′, s) − ui(x, s)]. The first term in
brackets relates to the gain in status; the second term to the loss in intrinsic benefits,
provided that x ≥ xˆi(s). Because
each action outside [min xˆi, xi(1, 0)] is strongly dominated, 13
no player will take his maximum action Li. In short, condition (5) ensures that,
given the actions of the others, each player eventually faces a trade-off between
gaining more status and getting more intrinsic benefits and that his best replies are
always interior actions.14
A third basic function is more general and contains xi (and xˆi) as a special
case. It is particularly useful when we study games with three or more players. Let
V is := [xˆ
i(s), xi(s, 0)] (s ∈ Q). (6)
Given a, b ∈ Q with a ≤ b and y ∈ V ia, there exists for each player i ∈ N a unique
xi+(b, a, y) ∈ V ib such that15
ui(xi+(b, a, y), b) = u
i(y, a).
This function is illustrated in Figure 2. It is seen that xi+(b, a, y) = x
i(b, a) if y = xˆi(a)
(other properties are in Lemmas 20 and 21 in Appendix A).
12The first inequality follows from Lemma 20 in Appendix A and the second from ui(Li, b) <
ui(xˆi(a), a).
13First, recall our vector notation: xıˆ = (x1, . . . , xi−1 , xi+1 , . . . , xN), so xıˆ ∈ RN−1. Similarly, we
write Xıˆ := X1×·· ·×Xi−1×Xi+1×·· ·×XN . Case xi > xi(1, 0): we show that xˆi(0) strongly dominates
xi. Well, for all z ∈ Xıˆ we have, vi(xi; z) ≤ ui(xi, 1) < ui(xi(1, 0), 1) = ui(xˆi(0), 0) ≤ vi(xˆi(0), z). So
vi(xi; z) < vi(xˆi(0); z), as desired.
Case xi < min xˆi: let c ∈ Q be such that min xˆi = xˆi(c). We prove that xi is strongly dominated by
xˆi(c). Well, let z ∈ Xıˆ and write a := Fz(xi), b := Fz(xˆi(c)). Noting that a ≤ b and xi < xˆi(c) ≤ xˆi(a),
we obtain vi(xi; z) = ui(xi, a) < ui(xˆi(c, a) ≤ ui(xˆi(c), b) = vi(xˆi(c); z). So vi(xi; z) < vi(xˆi(s); z), as
desired.
14In a two-goods setting (including a non-positional good) with utility U(xi, yi; si) and only
individual differences in real income (wi/px), condition (5) generally comes to U( w
i
px
, 0; 1) <
max U(·, ·; 0) on the budget set. So it is assumed that consumers will never spend their entire in-
come on positional goods.
15To see that xi+ is well-defined, note that, from (5), u
i(xi(b, 0), b) = ui(xˆi(0), 0) = ui(xi(a, 0), a) ≤
ui(y, a) ≤ ui(xˆi(a), a) ≤ ui(xˆi(b), b) and ui(·, b) is continuous and strictly decreasing on V ib.
10
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 24
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art24
....
....
..........
..............
....
.....................................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................................
............................................
.............................................
..............................................................
................................................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . ......................................
......
......
.....
.......
......
.....
......
......
.....
....
....
.....
.....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.....
......
.......
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
....
.....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.....
....
....
....
.....
......
.......
........
........
.........
............
................
.................... .....................................................................................................................................................................................
.......
.......
.......
.......
......
.....
.....
....
.....
....
...
.....
.....
.....
.....
...
....
....
....
....
....
.....
.............
....................
...................
.................
................
...............
.............
...........
.............
........................................................................................................
Li
xi
ui
xˆi(a)xˆi(b) xˆi(0)
y
x¯i(a, 0) x¯i(b, 0)
x¯i+(b, a, y)
ui(·, b)
ui(·, a)
ui(·, 0)
Figure 2: Determination of xi+(b, a, y).
The three functions xˆi, xi, and xi+ are the main auxiliary objects of our ex-
position. Action xˆi(s) is the intrinsic action of player i at status level s. If s′ > s is
some higher status level that can be attained by the higher action xi(s′, s) > xˆi(s),
then player i is indifferent between xˆi(s) and xi(s′, s). We will call xi(s′, s) his
matching action (of xˆi(s) at s′) and xi his matching function. And, more gener-
ally, if y ∈ V is is a certain action of player i that yields status s and if s′ > s is
some higher status level that can be attained by the higher action xi+(s
′, s, y) > y,
then player i is indifferent between y and xi+(s
′, s, y). Function xi+ will be called his
general matching function. Here is an example:
Example 2 Suppose ui(xi, s) := − | xi−Ai | + Bis, where Ai, Bi > 0 and Ai+Bi < Li.
Note that ui is indeed strictly quasi-concave in xi and that condition (5) is satisfied.
Bi refers to player i’s sensitivity to status. His intrinsic action is
xˆi = Ai,
which is independent of status here. Given a, b ∈ Q with a ≤ b, we can solve
− | xi − Ai | +Bib = Bia for xi ∈ [Ai, Li]. Hence, his matching function is
xi(b, a) = Ai + Bi(b − a).
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Also, given a, b ∈ Q with a ≤ b and y ∈ V ia = [Ai, Ai +Bia], we can solve − | xi+−Ai |
+Bib = − | y − Ai | +Bia for xi+ ∈ V ib = [Ai, Ai + Bib]. Then his general matching
function follows as
xi+(b, a, y) = y + B
i(b − a)
(the reader may verify that xi+ = x
j
+ ⇒ xi = x j and xi = x j ⇒ xˆi = xˆ j). 
Consider now the status variable. With z = (z1, . . . , zN−1) ∈ RN−1, we define
the function Fz : R→ R by
Fz(x) :=
#{ j | z j ≤ x}
N − 1 .
Fz is an increasing upper semi-continuous function with image in Q and the set of
points where it is discontinuous is {z1, . . . , zN−1}. Even Fz is a step function. With
x = (xi; xıˆ) ∈ X, the status production function of player i is defined as the function
si : X→R given by
si(x) :=
#{ j ∈ N\{i} | x j ≤ xi}
N − 1 = Fxıˆ(x
i). (7)
We call si(x) the status of i in x. Since Fxıˆ is invariant for permutations of the
coefficients of xıˆ, it does not matter which other player takes a certain action: all
players are of equal social importance. With status production function (7), two
players acquire the same status in x if and only if they take the same action:16
Proposition 3 Given a multi-action x ∈ X and two players i, j ∈ N , it holds that
si(x) = s j(x) if and only if xi = x j. 
Next, consider the players themselves. The payoff function of player i can
now be written as vi(x) = ui(xi, si(x)). Given the nature of the status production
function, vi is discontinuous in xi (when the fixed actions of all other players are not
all zero). It directly follows that also each payoff function is discontinuous. Figure 3
shows that vi(·; x j) is not quasi concave anymore when x j moves sufficiently to the
right. Actually the payoff functions have such bad properties that the well-known
theorems on the existence of Nash equilibria (like that of Reny, 1999) cannot be
applied.
16‘⇒’ is evident. ‘⇐’ we proof by contradiction. So suppose si(x) = s j(x) and xi , x j. We may
suppose xi < x j. This implies the strict inclusion {l ∈ N | xl ≤ xi} ⊂ {l ∈ N | xl ≤ x j} and therefore
si(x) < s j(x).
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ui(·, 1)
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vi(·; x j)
◦
ui(·, 0)
x j
Figure 3: Case N = 2. Conditional payoff function of player i.
Players may weigh intrinsic benefits and status differently. Differences in
payoff functions may become consequential when they apply to the sets
Di := [min xˆi, xi(1, 0)]
We already know that actions outside Di are strongly dominated. How we dis-
tinguish between players on the basis of their payoff functions is a delicate issue,
because, as will be seen, it influences our classification of equilibria into separating
and pooling equilibria. Although some arbitrariness cannot be avoided, we think
the following definition is the most suitable. Note first that ∪s∈QV is ⊆ Di, because
xi(s, 0) ≤ xi(1, 0). We assume that any pair of players is either homogeneous or
heterogeneous, according to
Definition 4 Two players i, j ∈ N are homogeneous if Di ⊆ X j, D j ⊆ Xi and for
each s, s′ ∈ Q and x ∈ V is ∪ V js , x′ ∈ V is′ ∪ V js′
ui(x, s) ≥ ui(x′, s′)⇔ u j(x, s) ≥ u j(x′, s′). (8)
Otherwise they are heterogeneous. 
Writing i ∼ j if players i and j are homogeneous, it is immediately seen that the
relation ∼ is an equivalence relation onN . Also note that players i and j are homo-
geneous if (8) holds over the same overall action set X := Xi = X j. Further, i and
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j are homogeneous if and only if a strictly increasing function f exists such that
u j = f ◦ ui, so in an ordinal sense homogeneous players have the same payoff func-
tions (see Lemma 22 in Appendix A). Yet the most important point to observe is
that our definition of homogeneous players links up well with the general matching
function xi+:
Theorem 5 Players i and j are homogeneous if and only if xi+ = x
j
+. 
Heterogeneity is likely to induce allocations with a distribution of actions,
and the question is how this relationship exactly looks like. To that end, we study
the Nash equilibria of the game. Denoting a Nash-equilibrium by n = (n1, . . . , nN),
we already know that ni ∈ Di. The next result is much more specific about the
equilibrium action of player i:
Proposition 6 Suppose n is a Nash equilibrium. Then, for all i ∈ N ,
• ni ∈ V isi(n) = [xˆi(si(n)), xi(si(n), 0)];
• ni ∈ {xˆi(si(n))} ∪ {n1, . . . , ni−1, ni+1, . . . , nN}. 
Hence, in a Nash equilibrium, the action of player i equals his intrinsic action at
status level si(n) or some higher equilibrium action of one or more other players.
It does not exceed his matching action xi(si(n), 0) of xˆi(0) at si(n) since each action
outside [min xˆi, xi(1, 0)] is strongly dominated.
One particular issue is whether, in a Nash equilibrium, homogeneous play-
ers always act the same and heterogeneous players always act differently. Remark-
ably, the answer to the latter question is no: sometimes heterogeneous players be-
have differently, sometimes they do the same. It requires a complicated analysis
to identify the precise conditions determining the equilibrium behaviour of hetero-
geneous players. The answer to the former question is yes: homogeneous players
indeed act the same, as stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 7 Suppose i and j are homogeneous players. Then, for each Nash equi-
librium n, it holds ni = n j. 
Let us allocate the players to M equivalence classes, hereafter called homo-
geneity classes. So members of the same homogeneity class are homogeneous and
members from different classes are heterogeneous. Noting that 1 ≤ M ≤ N, the
case M = 1 will be referred to as complete homogeneity and the case M = N as
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complete heterogeneity. Then Theorem 7 directly implies that the number of differ-
ent actions in a Nash equilibrium is at most M. Equilibria with M different actions
show that members of the same homogeneity class choose the same action level.
Equilibria with fewer than M different actions are such that the members of two or
more homogeneity classes choose the same action level.
We will use the following terminology. Let E denote the set of Nash equi-
libria. For K ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, E(K) denotes the set of Nash equilibria with exactly K
different actions:
E(K) := {n ∈ E | #{n1, . . . , nN} = K}. (9)
It holds E = E(1) ∪ · · · ∪ E(M) (of course, the sets are disjoint). An element of E(K)
is called K-level equilibrium. Specifically, an element of E(1) is called single-level
equilibrium, and (borrowing the terminology of signalling games) an element of
E(M) separating equilibrium, and an element of E\E(M) pooling equilibrium. Note
that a Nash equilibrium with a non-degenerate social hierarchy, i.e. with K ≥ 2, re-
quires at least two homogeneity classes. If there is only one, so in case of complete
homogeneity, only a single-level equilibrium can exist (which is also a separating
equilibrium). But the presence of two or more homogeneity classes is not sufficient
for a non-degenerate social hierarchy, since it may entail a single-level equilibrium
(which is also a pooling equilibrium).
To be sure, until now nothing guarantees the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium. We have already remarked that the properties of our payoff functions preclude
the application of the standard existence theorems in the literature. So we cannot
rely on general results, and have to carry out the analysis largely from scratch.
Therefore, it is instructive to begin with studying a game with only two players,
which is done in Section 3. The general analysis with N players follows in Sections
4 and 5.
3 The status game with only two players
Examining an ordinal status game with only two players is worthwhile, because
it already produces a number of features that characterize the general case of N
players, such as the possibility of both separating and pooling equilibria. We can
also verify whether, in the absence of spillover effects, a Nash equilibrium is indeed
Pareto inefficient, as claimed by the literature on status seeking (see Introduction).
After re-stating the game in Section 3.1, we study the case of homogeneous players
in Section 3.2 and that of heterogeneous players in Section 3.3.
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3.1 The game
Consider a status game with two players. For {i, j} = {1, 2}, the payoff function of
player i is
vi(x1, x2) = ui(xi,
#{l | xl ≤ xi}
2 − 1 ) =
{
ui(xi, 0) if 0 ≤ xi < x j
ui(xi, 1) if x j ≤ xi ≤ Li,
which is presented by the solid curve in Figure 3 (for arbitrary x j).
It is convenient to work with reaction correspondences, although this con-
cept will not be used later on.17 Writing the reaction correspondence of player i as
Ri : X j ( Xi and noting that xˆi(1) < xi(1, 0), we find with the help of Figure 3
Ri(x j) =

{xˆi(1)} if 0 ≤ x j ≤ xˆi(1)
{x j} if xˆi(1) < x j < xi(1, 0)
{x j, xˆi(0)} if x j = xi(1, 0)
{xˆi(0)} if x j > xi(1, 0).
(10)
Figures 4–7 show that, with two players, a Nash equilibrium always exists.18 Here-
after we identify these equilibria (there may be more than one). Note that (10)
already implies that a Nash equilibrium n has ni ∈ {n j, xˆi(0), xˆi(1)}, as in line with
Proposition 6. That is, each player takes his intrinsic action (at s = 0 or s = 1) or
copies the action of the other player.
3.2 Complete homogeneity
If the two players are homogeneous, then xˆ1 = xˆ2 and x1 = x2. It follows that
R1 = R2 (if also L1 = L2). Figure 4 presents the reaction correspondence (10) of
each player.19 A Nash equilibrium is implied by the intersection of the graph of
17Expressing the reaction correspondences analytically becomes increasingly laborious as the
number of players goes up. For example, with 3 players, a reaction correspondence already contains
24 case expressions.
18For a formal proof first note that exactly one of the following three cases occurs: (1) xˆ1(1) <
x2(1, 0) and xˆ2(1) < x1(1, 0); (2) xˆ2(1) > x1(1, 0) or xˆ1(1) > x2(1, 0); (3) xˆ2(1) = x1(1, 0) or
xˆ1(1) = x2(1, 0). Case (1): with m1 := max{xˆ1(1), xˆ2(1)} and m2 := min{x1(1, 0), x2(1, 0)} we have
[xˆ1(1), x1(1, 0)]∩ [xˆ2(1), x2(1, 0)] = [m1,m2]. Because m1 < m2, we have by Theorem 8 (below) that
#E(1) = ∞. Case (2): by Theorem 15 we have #E(2) = 1. Case (3): we consider the case xˆ2(1) =
x1(1, 0); the reasoning for the other case is the same. We have [xˆ1(1), x1(1, 0)] ∩ [xˆ2(1), x2(1, 0)] =
{xˆ2(1)}. Then, by Theorem 8, #E(1) = 1.
19Although the diagram has xˆi(0) < xˆi(1), it is also possible that xˆi(0) ≥ xˆi(1); the only restriction
is max{xˆi(0), xˆi(1)} < xi(1, 0) (Lemma 20(i) in Appendix A). It is easily verified that the distinction
between these two cases bears no impact on the results. A similar remark holds for the possibility
that xˆi(0) = 0 or xˆi(1) = 0 and for Figures 5–7.
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R2 and the tranposed graph of R1. It is seen that a continuum of equilibria exists
and that, in each equilibrium, the two players take the same action, as implied
by Theorem 7. Hence, all equilibria are single-level equilibria. The set of Nash
equilibria is given by E = E(1) = {(a, a) | a ∈ [xˆ1(1), x1(1, 0)]}.
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xˆ1(0) xˆ1(1) x¯1(1, 0) L1
x¯2(1, 0)
L2
x1
x2
45◦
xˆ2(1)
xˆ2(0)
Figure 4: Homogeneous players. Infinitely many Nash equilibria.
This set can be ranked by the Pareto criterion. Since, in each equilibrium,
both players have the highest possible status (s = 1) and an action equal to or
greater than xˆ1(1), equilibria with higher action levels than xˆ1(1) bring lower pay-
offs. Hence, those with lower action levels are Pareto superior, and the Pareto-
dominating equilibrium is n = (xˆ1(1), xˆ1(1)). The latter is also Pareto efficient,
because both players receive their maximum payoffs u1(xˆ1(1), 1) and u2(xˆ1(1), 1).
3.3 Complete heterogeneity
Figures 5–7 show the reaction correspondences (10) if the two players are heteroge-
neous. They present three typical configurations of Nash equilibria. Figure 5 illus-
trates that, even though the players are heterogeneous, there may exist a continuum
of equilibria where they take the same action. This set of single-level equilibria,
now also pooling equilibria, is given by E = E(1) = {(a, a) | a ∈ ∩2i=1[xˆi(1), xi(1, 0)]}.
As before, these equilibria can be ranked by the Pareto criterion. Those with lower
action levels are superior, and the Pareto-dominating equilibrium is (xˆ2(1), xˆ2(1)).
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The latter is also Pareto efficient, because player 2 receives his maximum payoff
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Figure 5: Infinitely many Nash equilibria. (All pooling equilibria.)
and thus can only lose in case of a different action, while player 1 receives a lower
payoff u1(x1, 0) ≤ u1(xˆ1(0), 0) = u1(x1(1, 0), 1) < u1(xˆ2(1), 1) if he takes a low-
status action x1 < xˆ2(1), and a lower or equal payoff u1(x1, 1) ≤ u1(xˆ2(1), 1) if he
takes a high-status action x1 ≥ xˆ2(1).
Figure 6 shows a unique separating equilibrium, where the players take dif-
ferent actions and acquire different amounts of status. It represents the most simple
equilibrium social hierarchy. Formally, E = E(2) = {(xˆ1(0), xˆ2(1))}. The equilib-
rium is Pareto efficient, since player 2 gathers the maximum payoff, while player
1 gets a lower or equal payoff u1(x1, 0) ≤ u1(xˆ1(0), 0) if he takes a low-status ac-
tion x1 < xˆ2(1), and a lower payoff u1(x1, 1) ≤ u1(xˆ2(1), 1) < u1(x1(1, 0), 1) =
u1(xˆ1(0), 0) if he takes a high-status action x1 ≥ xˆ2(1).
Figure 7 shows a borderline case with a pooling equilibrium and a separating
equilibrium. Formally, E = E(1) ∪ E(2) with E(1) = {(xˆ2(1), xˆ2(1))} and E(2) =
{(xˆ1(0), xˆ2(1))}. Both equilibria are Pareto efficient for almost identical reasons as
before. Moreover, they yield the same payoff to each player: if nP refers to the
pooling equilibrium and nS to the separating equilibrium, v1(nP) = u1(xˆ2(1), 1) =
u1(x1(1, 0), 1) = u1(xˆ1(0), 0) = v1(nS ) and v2(nP) = u2(xˆ2(1), 1) = v2(nS ). This
figure illustrates the general point that we can have equilibria with different numbers
of action levels at the same time (see also Example 12).
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Figure 6: A unique Nash equilibrium. (A separating equilibrium.)
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Figure 7: Two Nash equilibria. (A separating and a pooling equilibrium.)
Comparing Figures 5–7, it is seen that the critical condition determining the
configuration of Nash equilibria is whether xˆ2(1) < x1(1, 0) (Figure 5), xˆ2(1) >
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x1(1, 0) (Figure 6), or xˆ2(1) = x1(1, 0) (Figure 7). Here xˆ2(1) is player 2’s intrinsic
action and x1(1, 0) is player 1’s matching action of xˆ1(0), both at the high status
level. Recalling that V is := [xˆ
i(s), xi(s, 0)], the critical condition thus sets demands
on how V11 compares with V
2
1 . To put it roughly, little heterogeneity of the players
(some overlap of V11 and V
2
1 ) gives rise to a continuum of pooling equilibria, com-
parable with complete homogeneity, and much heterogeneity (no overlap of V11 and
V21 ) gives rise to a unique separating equilibrium. This broad statement remains
valid in the general case of N players.
4 Existence of separating and pooling equilibria
Building on our insights from Section 2.2, we continue with the analysis of the
ordinal status game for any finite number N of players. The existence of a separating
equilibrium or a pooling equilibrium is studied in this section, the question of Pareto
efficiency in the next. Section 4.1 introduces some new terminology, Section 4.2
derives necessary conditions that are also sufficient for the existence of a K-level
equilibrium, and Section 4.3 focuses on the special case of separating equilibria.
4.1 Additional terminology
To study the existence of Nash equilibria with more than one action level, the rela-
tions between action levels and the subsets of players corresponding to these action
levels must be specified. We use the following terminology.
For K ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, write K := {1, . . . ,K}. An ordered partition of dimen-
sion K of N is a finite sequence (C1, . . . ,CK) of non-empty disjoint subsets of N
whose union is N . Now consider a multi-action x ∈ X and let #{x1, . . . , xN} = K.
Define real numbers c1, . . . , cK by
{x1, . . . , xN} = {c1, . . . , cK},, c1 < · · · < cK .
With these K numbers, or level data of x, we can define for k ∈ K
Ck := {i ∈ N |xi = ck}.
It follows that C = (C1, . . . ,CK) is an ordered partition of N . We call C the cluster
partition of x and its elements clusters. For example, x = (4, 2, 7, 4, 8) has cluster
partition C = ({2}, {1, 4}, {3}, {5}) and level data 2 < 4 < 7 < 8.20 We write EC for
the set of Nash equilibrium vectors with cluster partition C.
20The terminology allows us to define social hierarchy in a precise way. With a = (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
RN , let S a : R→ R be defined by S a(x) := #{ j | a j ≤ x}/N. Then, given a multi-action x, S x(xi)
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4.2 On the set of K-level equilibria E(K)
First of all, consider the case of K = 1 – an equilibrium with one single standard
of behaviour. Even in case of complete heterogeneity, so where the number of
homogeneity classes M equals N, there may exist equilibria where all players take
the same action. This is implied by21
Theorem 8 E(1) = {(a, . . . , a) | a ∈ ∩Ni=1V i1}. 
A single-level equilibrium does not necessarily exist, because the segments V i1 may
have an empty intersection. Of course, this is not possible if all players are ho-
mogeneous. In that case, an infinite number of Nash equilibria exist, which are all
single-level equilibria (because of Theorem 7).
To clarify the conditions for which a single-level equilibrium exists, let us
call two players i and j intrinsically identical if their intrinsic actions are the same,
i.e. if xˆi(s) = xˆ j(s) (s ∈ Q). Note that they may still be heterogeneous. Then
Theorem 8 implies that there may exist a single-level equilibrium even if no pair
of players is intrinsically identical. This is illustrated by the example below, where
individuals who care differently about the intrinsic utility of their actions still want
to conform to a single standard of behaviour, because their status concerns are suf-
ficiently important.
Example 9 Consider the status game of Example 2 in case of three players. As-
sume A1 < A2 < A3 and B := B1 = B2 = B3. Note that no pair of players is
intrinsically identical. Also, B indicates the marginal utility of status. Applying
Theorem 8, a 1-level (pooling) equilibrium exists if and only if
B ≥ A3 − A1.
In this case, E(1) = {(a, a, a) | a ∈ [A3, A1 + B]}. 
indicates the status level of player i as (e.g.) observed by a third party. It is closely related to the
status perceived by player i himself: S x(xi) = si(x)(N − 1)/N + 1/N. If x has cluster partition
(C1, . . . ,CK) and level data c1 < · · · < cK , then for all i ∈ Ck it holds S x(xi) = S x(ck). Accordingly,
the social hierarchy (or social ladder) implied by a multi-action x may be defined as the sequence
Hx := ((C1, S x(c1)), . . . , ((CK , S x(cK))). So a Nash equilibrium n implies an equilibrium social hi-
erarchy Hn. Note that two Nash equilibria with the same cluster partition (but different level data)
share the same equilibrium social hierarchy and vice versa.
21‘⊆’: let n = (a, . . . , a) ∈ E(1) and apply Proposition 6 (first result) with si(n) = Fnıˆ (ni) = 1 for
all i. ‘⊇’: for xi ∈ [a, Li], we have xˆi(1) ≤ a ≤ xi, so vi(xi; aıˆ) = ui(xi, 1) ≤ ui(a, 1) = vi(a; aıˆ). And
for xi ∈ [0, a), we have vi(xi; aıˆ) = ui(xi, 0) ≤ ui(xˆi(0), 0) = ui(xi(1, 0), 1) ≤ ui(a, 1) = vi(a; aıˆ).
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Next consider the case of an arbitrary number K of action levels. Some
additional notation is needed. We know a K-level equilibrium must be such that
each of the K clusters is a union of the M homogeneity classes. It follows that the
number of equilibrium action levels are restricted by the number of classes: K ≤ M.
Now consider an ordered partition C = (C1, . . . ,CK) of N . Define
s0 := − q2, sk :=
Σkj=1#C j − 1
N − 1 = qΣkj=1#C j (k ∈ K). (11)
If c1 < · · · < cK are the level data of a multi-action x, then sk is the status level of
the members of cluster Ck. With c0 := 0, define for given c1 < · · · < cK with c1 ≥ 0,
the actions yij (0 ≤ j < k) of player i by
yij := max
{
xˆi(s j + q2),min{c j, xi(s j + q2, 0)}
}
∈ V is j+q2
and the action x˘ik of player i by
x˘ik := min0≤ j<k
xi+(sk, s j + q2, y
i
j).
Note that x˘ik ∈ V isk (by definition of xi+).
Thus given a K-level multi-action x, we can identify its cluster partition
(C1, . . . ,CK) and level data c1 < · · · < cK , and so calculate the numbers x˘ik (k ∈ K ,
i ∈ Ck). This clears the ground for one of our central results:22
Theorem 10 Suppose n is a Nash equilibrium. Let C = (C1, . . . ,CK) be the cluster
partition and c1 < · · · < cK the level data of n. Then for each k ∈ K
• ck ∈ ∩i∈Ck[xˆi(sk), x˘ik].
• ck ≥ xi+(sk, s j, c j) (1 ≤ j < k, i ∈ C j). 
In a Nash equilibrium n, each player of cluster Ck has status level sk. By Proposi-
tion 6, if player i is the only member of cluster Ck, and so is heterogeneous with
respect to all other players, he chooses his intrinsic action xˆi(sk).23 The first state-
ment of Theorem 10 shows that if player i is not the only one in Ck (he may still be
22Here xi+(sk, s j, c j) is well-defined, because c j ∈ V is j .
23The intersection in the first statement of Theorem 10 then reduces to a single point xˆi(sk).
To see this, first note that because x˘ik ∈ V isk , we have x˘ik ≥ xˆi(sk) = ck. Now Lemma 24(i)
in Appendix A, noting that ck−1 < ck ≤ xi(sk, 0), gives x˘ik ≤ max
{
xˆi(sk),min{ck−1, xi(sk, 0)}
}
=
max
{
ck,min{ck−1, xi(sk, 0)}
}
= max {ck, ck−1} = ck. Hence ck = x˘ik.
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heterogeneous with respect to all other players), then his action may be higher than
his intrinsic action, being an element of the intersection of certain individual sets of
all the players of cluster Ck. The second statement of Theorem 10 basically implies
that the payoff to player i is not lower than the payoff from any other action level
with higher status than sk.
Theorem 10 gives necessary conditions for a K-level equilibrium to exist.
For each k ∈ K , there are two conditions and both are about the cluster partition
and the level data c1 < · · · < cK of n. Are these conditions together also sufficient
for the existence of a K-level equilibrium? The next theorem, another central result,
shows that this is indeed the case. (The dependence of x˘ik on c is made explicit in
the notation.)
Theorem 11 Fix an ordered partition C = (C1, . . . ,CK) of N . Suppose there exists
a strictly increasing vector c ∈ RK+ such that
• ck ∈ ∩i∈Ck[xˆi(sk), x˘ik(c)] (k ∈ K),
• ck ≥ xi+(sk, s j, c j) (k ∈ K , 1 ≤ j < k, i ∈ C j).
Then, with n the unique multi-action that has C as cluster partition and c1, . . . , cK
as level data, n is a K-level Nash equilibrium. 
Note that it is not clear, however, whether the two conditions of the above theorem
can always be satisfied. So the existence of a K-level equilibrium is not guaranteed.
An example may illustrate the gist of Theorems 10 and 11.
Example 12 Consider the status game of Example 2 in case of three players. As-
sume A1 < A2 < A3 and B := B1 = B2 = B3. Note that, as in Example 9, no pair of
players is intrinsically identical, but they have the same marginal utility of status,
indicated by B. Also, there are three homogeneity classes, i.e. M = 3.
• A 1-level (pooling) equilibrium exists if and only if
B ≥ A3 − A1.
In this case, E(1) = {(a, a, a) | a ∈ [A3, A1 + B]}. See Example 9.
• A 3-level (separating) equilibrium exists if and only if
B ≤ min{A3 − A1, 2(A2 − A1), 2(A3 − A2)}.
In this case, E(3) = {(A1, A2, A3)}. The proof is similar to the one below.
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• A 2-level (pooling) equilibrium with cluster partition C = ({1}, {2, 3}) exists if
and only if
2(A3 − A2) ≤ B ≤ A3 − A1.
In this case, E({1},{2,3}) = {(A1, c2, c2) | A1 + B ≤ c2 ≤ A2 + 12 B}.
To see this, suppose n ∈ E({1},{2,3}). Then, with c1 < c2 as level data, n =
(c1, c2, c2). By Theorem 10 (2nd result), we have c2 ≥ x1+(1, 0, c1). Therefore,
c2 ≥ c1 + B.
Moreover, by Proposition 6 and Theorem 10 (1st result), respectively,
c1 = xˆ1(0) = A1, c2 ∈ [xˆ2(1), x˘22] ∩ [xˆ3(1), x˘32] = [A2, x˘22] ∩ [A3, x˘32].
Evaluating the latter, we have for i = 2, 3, x˘i2 = min {xi(1, 0, yi0), xi(1, 12 , yi1)}
= min {yi0 + B, yi1+12 B}. Noting that
yi0 = xˆ
i(0) = Ai,
yi1 = max {xˆi( 12 ),min {c1, xi(12 , 0)}} = max {Ai,min {A1, Ai + 12 B}} = Ai,
we find x˘i2 = min {Ai + B, Ai + 12 B} = Ai + 12 B. Therefore,
c2 ∈ [A2, A2 + 12 B] ∩ [A3, A3 + 12 B],
which implies A3 ≤ A2 + 12 B and c2 ≤ A2 + 12 B.
Hence, if n ∈ E({1},{2,3}), then 2(A3 − A2) ≤ B ≤ A3 − A1 and E({1},{2,3}) =
{(A1, c2, c2) | A1 + B ≤ c2 ≤ A2 + 12 B}. Now, with Theorem 11, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that if 2(A3 − A2) ≤ B ≤ A3 − A1 and A1 + B ≤ c2 ≤ A2 + 12 B,
then (A1, c2, c2) ∈ E({1},{2,3}).
• A 2-level (pooling) equilibrium with cluster partition C = ({1, 2}, {3}) exists if
and only if
2(A2 − A1) ≤ B ≤ 2(A3 − A2).
In this case, E({1,2},{3}) = {(c1, c1, A3) | A2 ≤ c1 ≤ A1 + 12 B}. The proof is similar
to the above proof.
• None of the other four possible ordered partitions gives rise to a 2-level equi-
librium, so E({3},{1,2}) = E({2,3},{1}) = E({2},{1,3}) = E({1,3},{2}) = ∅.
Each statement can be proved by contradiction. For example, suppose n ∈
E({3},{1,2}) and let c1 < c2 denote the level data of n. Then c1 = xˆ3(0) = A3.
Now, by Theorem 10 (2nd result), we have c2 ≥ x3+(1, 0, c1) = c1 + B = A3 + B.
Moreover, we know that c2 ≤ x1(1, 0) = A1 + B, which is in contradiction with
c2 ≥ A3 + B. 
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In the example, players differ in their intrinsic valuation of their actions but
they are equally sensitive to status. The first two results illustrate two opposing
situations. If status concerns are sufficiently important relative to intrinsic concerns
(B is large), an equilibrium with complete pooling exists, where all players conform
to a single standard of conduct. Conversely, if status concerns are relatively unim-
portant (B is small), a separating equilibrium exists, where all players take their
intrinsic actions. The third and fourth results illustrate a situation where a major-
ity conforms to a single standard of behaviour, whereas a minority with relatively
individualistic preferences will violate this standard and choose separate actions.
Particularly these pooling equilibria show some similarities with the theory of con-
formity in Bernheim (1994). As in his theory, extreme individualistic preferences
result in deviations from the norm, and even slight deviations are accompanied by
a discontinuous change in status. This could be a fall in status but, in our case,
also a rise in status, as implied by the fourth result. From our example it is clear
that whether there is a low or a high standard of conduct, or even whether there
is more than one standard, all depends on how closely individual intrinsic utilities
are distributed relative to status concerns. Finally, note that the example identifies
all Nash equilibria. Comparing the inequality conditions of the four types, we see
that the game always (i.e. for all parameter values) has a Nash equilibrium. It
is even possible that all types of Nash equilibria exist simultaneously (namely if
B = A3 −A1 = 2(A3 −A2) ≤ 2(A2 −A1)). So we may have different types of pooling
equilibria alongside a separating equilibrium.24
4.3 On the set of separating equilibria E(M)
Consider the following definition to characterize the degree of heterogeneity among
players. Let Q++ := Q\{0}. We say that two players i, j ∈ N are superheteroge-
neous if the intrinsic actions of one player strictly exceed the associated matching
actions of the other player, i.e. if
xˆi(s) > x j(s, 0) (s ∈ Q++) or xˆ j(s) > xi(s, 0) (s ∈ Q++).
Superheterogeneous players are heterogeneous, because if they were homogeneous,
none of both systems of inequalities could hold.25 For illustration, it is easy to
show that in Example 12 all pairs of players are superheterogeneous if and only
if B < min{A2 − A1, A3 − A2}. In this case, so when status concerns are relatively
24This borderline case also implies that if C is a K-dimensional ordered partition for which a
K-level equilibrium exists, there may be another K-dimensional ordered partition C′ for which a
K-level equilibrium exists as well.
25Note that the inequalities are equivalent with V is < V
j
s (s ∈ Q++) or V is > V js (s ∈ Q++) (see (6)).
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unimportant, E = E(3) and #E = 1. It suggests that if the differences among play-
ers are large enough, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it is a separating
equilibrium. We will verify this below and also explore the general case of M
homogeneity classes where members of different classes are superheterogeneous
(using Theorems 10 and 11).
Let us simplify notation a bit. If cluster Ck is a homogeneity class, then for
all i, j ∈ Ck the functions xˆi and xˆ j are the same and also xi and x j, so we can define
xˆk := xˆi = xˆ j and xk := x
i
= x j.
Now suppose each pair of heterogeneous players is superheterogeneous.
Then there exists a unique ordered partition H = (H1, . . . ,HM) of N such that
eachHk is a homogeneity class and the strict inequalities
xk(s, 0) < xˆk+1(s) (k = 1, . . . ,M − 1, s ∈ Q++) (12)
hold. For this situation we have
Proposition 13 EH , ∅, so there exists a separating equilibrium. Even, EH is
equal to the set of multi-actions with cluster partitionH and level data c1 < ··· < cM
such that
ck ∈ [xˆk(sk), xk(sk, sk−1 + q2)] (k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}). 
Hence, if there is a certain ‘minimum distance’ between the homogeneity classes,
then there always exists a separating equilibrium. In case of classes with two or
more members (so M < N), there even exists a continuum of separating equilibria,
because the equilibrium action of such a homogeneity class belongs to an interval.
With only one member per class (so M = N), the interval reduces to a single point
xˆk(sk),26 which implies a unique separating equilibrium. Here is an example:
Example 14 Consider the status game of Example 2 in case of three players. As-
sume A := A1 = A2 < A3 and B := B1 = B2 = B3, so there are two homogeneity
classes. Also, assume A3 > A + B, implying that all pairs of heterogeneous players
are superheterogeneous. Note that status concerns are relatively unimportant. Ap-
plying Proposition 13, a continuum of 2-level (separating) equilibria with cluster
partitionH = ({1, 2}, {3}) exists:
E({1,2},{3}) = {(c1, c1, A3) | A ≤ c1 ≤ A + 12 B}. 
Even a stronger result obtains: the set EH in Proposition 13 contains all
Nash equilibria. First, it can be shown that no separating equilibria exist under
26Since then xk(sk, sk−1 + q2) = xk(sk, sk) = xˆk(sk).
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alternative rankings of the homogeneity classes (so E(M) = EH ). In other words, if
we have an equilibrium social ladder with one homogeneity class on each of the M
rungs, these classes cannot trade places and form another equilibrium social ladder
with as many rungs. Second, the distance between homogeneity classes rules out
the possibility of pooling equilibria (so E = E(M)). The next theorem summarizes
the most important points.
Theorem 15 If all pairs of heterogeneous players are superheterogeneous, then
• E = E(M);
• if M < N, then #E = ∞; if M = N, then #E = 1. 
5 Pareto efficiency of Nash equilibria
We now turn to the efficiency question. The efficiency properties of Nash equilibria
are rather difficult to disclose because of combinatorial aspects. For the case of
only two (heterogeneous) players, we already found that separating equilibria are
always Pareto efficient whereas pooling equilibria are generally not, although one
of them is also efficient (see Section 3.3). For more than two players, however, this
conclusion must be modified.
The first point we establish is that a Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient if
all players take their relevant intrinsic actions:
Theorem 16 Suppose n is a Nash equilibrium with ni = xˆi(si(n)) for all i ∈ N .
Then n is Pareto efficient. 
It follows that a K-level equilibrium is Pareto efficient if it has a cluster partition
and level data such that ck = xˆi(sk) for all i ∈ Ck. We already know that the latter
holds if each player is the only member of his cluster, so we have
Theorem 17 In case of complete heterogeneity (M = N), each separating equilib-
rium is Pareto efficient. 
Recall that if all pairs of players are superheterogeneous, the separating equilibrium
is the only Nash equilibrium that exists.
Whether each separating equilibrium is also Pareto efficient in the absence
of complete heterogeneity remains to be seen. Any ordered partition of the players
then includes a cluster with two or more homogeneous members, which makes that
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a separating equilibrium is generally not unique. The possibility of multiple Nash
equilibria is of course also inherent in pooling equilibria. The next result sheds light
on this issue.
Proposition 18 Let C = (C1, . . . ,CK) be an ordered partition of N . Then
• for all n,n′ ∈ EC with n′ > n, n is a Pareto improvement of n′.
Suppose x∗ is a K-level multi-action with cluster partition C and level data
maxi∈C1 xˆ
i(s1) < · · · < maxi∈CK xˆi(sK).
• Each n ∈ EC with n , x∗ is not Pareto efficient: x? is a Pareto improvement
of n.
• If x∗ ∈ EC, then
1. if K = M, x∗ is Pareto efficient;
2. if K < M, x∗ is weakly Pareto efficient, but may be Pareto inefficient. 
Let us begin with the case of separating equilibria (K = M). Then each cluster is a
homogeneity class, so x∗ has level data xˆ1(s1) < · · · < xˆM(sM). To fix ideas, suppose
the homogeneity classes are so differentiated that all pairs of heterogeneous play-
ers are also superheterogeneous. Then, according to Proposition 13, there exists a
family of separating equilibria, and Proposition 18 states that these equilibria are
generally inefficient. The inefficiency arises because the members of each homo-
geneity class typically overact. They choose action levels that are higher than their
intrinsic actions, xˆk(sk) if they belong to cluster Ck. A lower action level would
yield a Pareto improvement and lead to a superior equilibrium. Contrary to the
sub-optimality results in the literature, however, there does exist a unique Pareto-
efficient Nash equilibrium because x∗ ∈ EC. Yet this equilibrium may not exist if
the gaps between the homogeneity classes are less wide.
For pooling equilibria (K < M), we find a similar result, but with an impor-
tant exception. A pooling equilibrium generally belongs to a continuum of equi-
libria with the same cluster partition and one member of this continuum is a Pareto
improvement over another member if it has lower action levels. The difference with
separating equilibria arises when the multi-action x∗ defined in Proposition 18 is a
Nash equilibrium. Although in that case x∗ Pareto dominates all the other pooling
equilibria and is also weakly Pareto efficient,27 it may not be Pareto efficient. It is
true that having different xˆi functions within a cluster does not necessarily mean
that x∗ is inefficient,28 but this outcome cannot be ruled out. The point is that, rather
27So there does not exist a multi-action that makes all players strictly better off than under x∗.
28An example is provided by the two-players status game in Section 3.3.
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than taking the same actions, heterogeneous players in a cluster may be better off
by taking different actions. Here is an illustration:
Example 19 Consider the status game of Example 2 in case of three players. As-
sume A1 < A2 < A3 and B := B1 = B2 = B3. In Example 12, we established the
existence of a family of single-level equilibria in case B > A3 − A1. Let us as-
sume that this restriction holds. The Pareto-dominating member of this family is
n = (A3, A3, A3). The payoff to player i amounts to ui(A3, 1).
Now consider another multi-action where players 1 and 2 take action A2
and player 3 stays with A3. Since A2 < A3, the payoff to player 3 remains the
same. The payoffs to players 1 and 2 are u1(A2, 12 ) and u
2(A2, 12 ), and the changes
in payoffs are
u1(A2, 12 ) − u1(A3, 1) = u2(A2, 12 ) − u2(A3, 1) = A3 − (A2 + 12 B).
So the multi-action is a Pareto improvement if and only if B < 2(A3 − A2). 
In summary, we find that both pooling and separating equilibria are gener-
ally not Pareto efficient, which is in line with the literature on status seeking, but
that there is at least one important exception to this rule. If players are sufficiently
heterogeneous, then there exists a Nash equilibrium that is unique, separating, and
Pareto efficient. The reason is that surpassing another higher-ranked individual now
requires a relatively high action level, so that the intrinsic costs of changing one’s
action beyond the socially optimal level may be prohibitive.
6 Concluding remarks
Above we analyzed a non-cooperative game in strategic form where each player’s
payoff depends on his action and his social status, which is given by the fraction of
players who take a lower or equal action than him. We focused on the relation be-
tween the degree of heterogeneity among status-seeking players and the distribution
of their Nash equilibrium actions. Our approach stands out because it does not use
the heuristic assumption of a continuum of players. The finding of multiple Nash
equilibria and different types of Nash equilibria – separating and pooling equilib-
ria – brings forward that concerns for relative position can integrate both economic
and sociological explanations of human behaviour. Loosely speaking, if intrinsic
concerns are sufficiently important relative to status concerns, individual equilib-
rium actions diverge – which agrees with the economic notion that differences in
preferences or constraints induce different behaviour. Conversely, if status con-
cerns are relatively important, individual equilibrium actions are the same – which
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accords with the sociological notion that social interdependence promotes uniform
behaviour. Another key result of the analysis is that, in contrast to what is usually
claimed, status seeking need not always be socially inefficient. If players are suf-
ficiently heterogeneous, there exists a Nash equilibrium that is unique, separating,
and Pareto efficient.
One question remains unanswered: does each ordinal status game have a
Nash equilibrium? The answer is yes in case of only two players and in case of
superheterogeneity, but the specific properties of the payoff functions did not allow
us to use the known existence theorems (for games with discontinuous payoff func-
tions) to prove the general case. However, we did derive two technical results that
establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium
(given a cluster partition and a set of level data).
A Proofs
Lemma 20 For each player i ∈ N , it holds
(i) a < b⇒ xi(b, a) > max{xˆi(a), xˆi(b)} (a, b ∈ Q);
(ii) xi is strictly increasing in its first variable and strictly decreasing in its second
variable. 
Proof.— (ii). First statement: by contradiction. Suppose a ≤ b1 < b2 and xi(b1, a) ≥
xi(b2, a). Then x
i(b1, a) ≥ xi(b2, a) ≥ xˆi(b2), and therefore ui(xˆi(a), a) = ui(xi(b2, a),
b2) ≥ ui(xi(b1, a), b2) > ui(xi(b1, a), b1) = ui(xˆi(a), a), a contradiction.
Second statement: we have ui(xˆi(a1), a1) < ui(xˆi(a2), a2) ≤ ui(xˆi(b), b), i.e.
ui(xi(b, a1), b) < ui(x
i(b, a2), b) ≤ ui(xˆi(b), b). The desired result follows because
xi(b, a1), x
i(b, a2) ≥ xˆi(b) and the function ui(·, b) is strictly decreasing on the seg-
ment [xˆi(b), Li].
(i). By (ii) xi(b, a) > xi(b, b) = xˆi(b) and xi(b, a) > xi(a, a) = xˆi(a). Q.e.d.
Lemma 21 For each player i ∈ N , it holds
(i) a = b⇒ xi+(b, a, y) = y (b ∈ Q, y ∈ V ib);
(ii) a < b⇒ xi+(b, a, y) > max{y, xˆi(b)} (a, b ∈ Q, y ∈ V ia);
(iii) c ≤ a ≤ b⇒ xi+(b, a, xi(a, c)) = xi(b, c) (a, b, c ∈ Q);
(iv) xi+ is strictly increasing in its first variable, strictly decreasing in its second
variable, and strictly increasing in its third variable. 
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Proof.— (i) Evident, noting that y ≥ xˆi(b). (iii) Because xi(b, c) ∈ [xˆi(b), Li] and
ui(xi(b, c), b) = ui(xˆi(c), c) = ui(xi(a, c), a).
(iv) First statement: take b1, b2 ∈ Q with b1 < b2 and let a ∈ Q with
a ≤ b1 and y ∈ V ia. Then ui(xi+(b1, a, y), b1) = ui(y, a) = ui(xi+(b2, a, y), b2). So
ui(xi+(b1, a, y), b1) = u
i(xi+(b2, a, y), b2). Assuming x
i
+(b1, a, y) ≥ xi+(b2, a, y) leads to
a contradiction. Indeed, then xi+(b1, a, y) ≥ xi+(b2, a, y) ≥ xˆi(b2) and it follows that
ui(xi+(b1, a, y), b1) < u
i(xi+(b1, a, y), b2) ≤ ui(xi+(b2, a, y), b2),
a contradiction.
Second statement: take a1, a2 ∈ Q with a1 < a2 and let b ∈ Q with b ≥ a2
and y ∈ V ia1 ∩ V ia2 . Then ui(xi+(b, a1, y), b) = ui(y, a1) < ui(y, a2) = ui(xi+(b, a2, y), b).
So ui(xi+(b, a1, y), b) < u
i(xi+(b, a2, y), b). Because x
i
+(b, a1, y), x
i
+(b, a2, y) ≥ xˆi(b) it
follows that xi+(b, a1, y) > x
i
+(b, a2, y).
Third statement: let y1 < y2. Because ui(·, a) is strictly decreasing on
[xˆi(a), Li] and y1, y2 ≥ xˆi(a) it follows that ui(y1, a) > ui(y2, a). So ui(xi+(b, a, y1), b) =
ui(y1, a) > ui(y2, a) = ui(x
i
+(b, a, y2), b). Because x
i
+(b, a, y1), x
i
+(b, a, y2) ≥ xˆi(b)
and ui(·, b) is strictly decreasing on [xˆi(b), Li] it follows, as desired, that xi+(b, a, y1) <
xi+(b, a, y2).
(ii). By (iv), xi+(b, ·, y) is strictly decreasing. So xi+(b, a, y) > xi+(b, b, y) = y.
Also, by (iv), xi+(b, a, y) ≥ xi+(b, a, xˆi(a)) = xi(b, a) > xˆi(b). Q.e.d.
Lemma 22 Let (i, j) be a pair of players of a status game with Di ⊆ X j and D j ⊆
Xi. Let U := ∪s∈Q {ui(x, s) | s ∈ Q, x ∈ V is ∪ V js }. Then
• i ∼ j if and only if there exists a strictly increasing function f : U → R such
that u j(x, s) = ( f ◦ ui)(x, s) (s ∈ Q, x ∈ V is ∪ V js );
• if i ∼ j, then the above function f is unique. 
Proof.— First statement. Suppose f is such. Let s, s′ ∈ Q and x ∈ V is ∪ V js ,
x′ ∈ V is′ ∪ V js′ . Then, because f is strictly increasing,
u j(x, s) ≥ u j(x′, s′) ⇔ f (ui(x, s)) ≥ f (ui(x′, s′)) ⇔ ui(x, s) ≥ ui(x′, s′).
So i ∼ j.
Now suppose i ∼ j. Define the function f : U → R as follows. Fix z ∈ U.
Let s ∈ Q and x ∈ V is ∪ V js be such that ui(x, s) = z. Define
f (z) := u j(x, s).
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This definition does not depend on x and s, because if also ui(x′, s′) = z (where
s′ ∈ Q and x′ ∈ V is′ ∪ V js′) then ui(x, s) = ui(x′, s′) and thus, because i ∼ j, also
u j(x, s) = u j(x′, s′). Hence,
u j(x, s) = ( f ◦ ui)(x, s) (s ∈ Q, x ∈ V is ∪ V js ).
Also f is strictly increasing. For suppose z, z′ ∈ U with z > z′. Then, with s, s′ ∈ Q
and x ∈ V is ∪ V js , x′ ∈ V is′ ∪ V js′ such that z = ui(x, s) and z′ = ui(x′, s′), it holds
that ui(x, s) > ui(x′, s′) and thus, because i ∼ j, u j(x, s) > u j(x′, s′). It follows that
f (z) = u j(x, s) > u j(x′, s′) = f (z′).
Second statement. To see that f is unique, suppose also g : U → R is an
increasing function that satisfies u j(x, s) = (g ◦ ui)(x, s) (s ∈ Q, x ∈ V is ∪ V js ). To
prove that f = g, take z ∈ U and let s ∈ Q, x ∈ V is ∪ V js be such that z = ui(x, s).
Then we have f (z) = f (ui(x, s)) = u j(x, s) = g(ui(x, s)) = g(z). Q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 5. We prove that i ∼ j⇔ xi+ = x j+.
‘⇒’: Suppose i ∼ j. Let s ∈ Q. By definition, xˆi(s) is the unique maximizer
of ui(·, s). In particular, noting V js ⊆ Xi,
ui(xˆi(s), s) > ui(x, s) (x ∈ V js \ {xˆi(s)}).
So, since we may replace ‘≥’ in (8) by ‘>’,
u j(xˆi(s), s) > u j(x, s) (x ∈ V js \ {xˆi(s)}).
This implies xˆi(s) = xˆ j(s), and we have proved that xˆi = xˆ j.
Let a, b ∈ Q with b ≥ a. By definition, xi(b, a) is the unique element of V ib
for which ui(xi(b, a), b) = ui(xˆi(a), a). By the above xˆi(b) = xˆ j(b) and xˆi(a) = xˆ j(a),
so xi(b, a) is the unique element of [xˆ j(b), xi(1, 0)] for which
ui(xi(b, a), b) = ui(xˆ j(a), a).
So, since we may replace ‘≥’ in (8) by ‘=’, xi(b, a) is the unique element of [xˆ j(b),
xi(1, 0)] for which
u j(xi(b, a), b) = u j(xˆ j(a), a).
But this element is x j(b, a). So xi(b, a) = x j(b, a), and we have proved that xi = x j.
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Now, fix a, b ∈ Q with b ≥ a and y ∈ V ia. We have
ui(xi+(b, a, y), b) = u
i(y, a).
Because xi+(b, a, y) ∈ V ib and y ∈ V ia, i ∼ j implies (since we may replace ‘≥’ in (8)
by ‘=’)
u j(xi+(b, a, y), b) = u
j(y, a).
By definition, x j+(b, a, y) is the unique element z ∈ V jb (= V ib) such that
u j(z, b) = u j(y, a).
So, x j+(b, a, y) = x
i
+(b, a, y).
‘⇐’: Suppose xi+ = x j+. Because the domains of these functions are the
same, it holds Vs := V is = V
j
s (s ∈ Q). So Di ⊆ X j, D j ⊆ Xi. Let U := ∪s∈Q
{ui(x, s) | s ∈ Q, x ∈ Vs}. We will show that there exists a strictly increasing
function f : U→ R such that u j(x, s) = ( f ◦ ui)(x, s) (s ∈ Q, x ∈ Vs). Then i ∼ j by
Lemma 22 above, and the proof is complete.
Fix z ∈ U and choose s ∈ Q and x ∈ Vs such that ui(x, s) = z. Define
f (z) := u j(x, s).
The function f does not depend on x and s, because if also ui(x′, s′) = z, where
s′ ∈ Q and x′ ∈ Vs′ , it holds u j(x, s) = u j(x′, s′). To see this, suppose (without loss
of generality) that s′ ≥ s. By definition, ui(x, s) = ui(xi+(s′, s, x), s′), so we have
ui(xi+(s
′, s, x), s′) = ui(x′, s′).
Because xi+(s
′, s, x), x′ ≥ xˆi(s′), it follows xi+(s′, s, x) = x′. So, because xi+ = x j+,
x j+(s
′, s, x) = x′. Since u j(x, s) = u j(x j+(s
′, s, x), s′) by definition, this gives u j(x, s) =
u j(x′, s′).
Therefore, by construction, we can write
u j(x, s) = ( f ◦ ui)(x, s) (s ∈ Q, x ∈ Vs).
The function f is strictly increasing. For let z, z′ ∈ U with z < z′. Then, with
s, s′ ∈ Q, x ∈ Vs, and x′ ∈ Vs′ such that z = ui(x, s) and z′ = ui(x′, s′), it holds
ui(x, s) < ui(x′, s′). Because i ∼ j, we have u j(x, s) < u j(x′, s′), which implies
f (z) = u j(x, s) < u j(x′, s′) = f (z′). Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 6. First statement: let b := Fnıˆ(ni). We prove ni ∈ V ib (i ∈ N)
by contradiction. We have V isi(n) = V
i
b = [xˆ
i(b), xi(b, 0)]. Suppose ni < xˆi(b). Then
Fnıˆ(xˆi(b)) ≥ Fnıˆ(ni) = b. Using this, we have
vi(ni; nıˆ) = ui(ni, b) < ui(xˆi(b), b) ≤ ui(xˆi(b), Fnıˆ(xˆi(b))) = vi(xˆi(b); nıˆ),
a contradiction.
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Suppose ni > xi(b, 0). Then, from Lemma 20, also ni > xˆi(b). Using this,
we have
vi(ni; nıˆ) = ui(ni, b) < ui(xi(b, 0), b) = ui(xˆi(0), 0) = vi(xˆi(0); nıˆ),
a contradiction.
Second statement: we even prove by contradiction that, with Ri : Xi 7→ Xi
the reaction function of player i, for each z ∈ Xıˆ one has
xi ∈ Ri(z) ⇒ xi ∈ {z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zN} ∪ {xˆi(si(n))}.
So suppose xi ∈ Ri(z), but xi < {z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zN}∪{xˆi(si(xi; z))}. Because xi <
{z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zN}, there exists δ > 0 such that si(·; z) is constant, say s, on
Xi∩(xi−δ, xi+δ). It follows that si(xi; z) = s and viz(a) = ui(a, s) on Xi∩(xi−δ, xi+δ).
Because xi , xˆi(s), there exists η > 0 such that xˆi(s) < (xi − η, xi + η). xˆi(s) is the
unique maximiser of ui(·, s). Now consider vi(·; z) on Xi ∩ (xi − , xi + ) where
 := min {δ, η}. Because this restricted function is strictly quasi-concave and does
not have the maximizer xˆi(s) in its domain, it is strictly monotone and it follows
that this function does not have a maximizer. In particular xi is not a maximizer
of this function and thus also not of the unrestricted function vi(·; z). This is a
contradiction. Q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 7. We proceed by contradiction: suppose ni , n j (with i , j).
We may also suppose ni < n j. Note first that
Fnıˆ(n j) = Fn ˆ(n j) and Fnıˆ(ni) = Fn ˆ(ni) − q2.
Now, because n is a Nash-equilibrium, vi(ni; nıˆ) ≥ vi(n j; nıˆ) and v j(n j; n ˆ) ≥ v j(ni; n ˆ).
Therefore,
ui(ni, Fnıˆ(ni)) ≥ ui(n j, Fnıˆ(n j)) = ui(n j, Fn ˆ(n j)),
or, with s := Fnıˆ(ni) and s′ := Fn ˆ(n j),
ui(ni, s) ≥ ui(n j, s′).
Because i and j are homogeneous, and noting that ni ∈ V is and n j ∈ V js′ by Proposi-
tion 6 (first result), this implies
u j(ni, s) ≥ u j(n j, s′).
But we also have
u j(n j, s′) = u j(n j, Fn ˆ(n j)) ≥ u j(ni, Fn ˆ(ni)) = u j(ni, Fnıˆ(ni) + q2)
> u j(ni, Fnıˆ(ni)) = u j(ni, s)
which is a contradiction. Q.e.d.
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Lemma 23 Consider a K-level multi-action x of a status game. LetC = (C1, . . . ,CK)
be the cluster partition and c1 < · · · < cK the level data of x. Define the function
λ : N → K by
λ(i) is the unique element of K for which i ∈ Cλ(i),
and call this the label function of C. Then we have for each i ∈ N and z ∈ R
Fxıˆ(z) =
{
sk + q2 if ck ≤ z < ck+1, where k = 0, . . . , λ(i) − 1,
sk if ck ≤ z < ck+1, where k = λ(i), . . . ,K.
In particular, we have for each i ∈ N
si(x) =
−1 + Σλ(i)j=1#C j
N − 1 = sλ(i), v
i(x) = ui(cλ(i), sλ(i)). 
Proof.— Suppose ck ≤ z < ck+1 with 0 ≤ k ≤ λ(i) − 1. Then the members of
C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck are exactly the players that take an action that is at most of level z.
Noting that i < C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck, we obtain that Fxıˆ(z) equals the number of elements
of C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck divided by N − 1, as desired.
Now suppose ck ≤ z < ck with λ(i) ≤ k ≤ K. Then, again, the members
of C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck are exactly the players with an action that is at most z. But now
i ∈ C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck. So Fxıˆ(z) equals the number of elements of C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck minus 1
divided by N − 1, as desired.
Finally, taking z = xi, we have z = cλ(i), and obtain the formulas for si(x)
and vi(x). Q.e.d.
Lemma 24 For each player i ∈ N , it holds
(i) If Ck = {i} and ck−1 ≤ xi(sk, 0), then x˘ik ≤ max
{
xˆi(sk), ck−1
}
.
(ii) If x˘ik < x
i(sk, 0), then for all l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} for which x˘ik = xi+(sk, sl + q2, yil):
yil = max{xˆi(sl + q2), cl}. 
Proof.— (i) Because #Ck = 1, sk = sk−1 + q2. Now, with Lemma 21(i),
x˘ik = min0≤ j<k
xi+(sk, s j + q2, y
i
j) ≤ xi+(sk, sk−1 + q2, yik−1) = xi+(sk, sk, yik−1) = yik−1.
Next we determine yik−1. Noting that ck−1 < ck ≤ xi(sk, 0),
yik−1 = max
{
xˆi(sk−1 + q2),min{ck−1, xi(sk−1 + q2, 0)}
}
= max
{
xˆi(sk),min{ck−1, xi(sk, 0)}
}
= max
{
xˆi(sk), ck−1
}
.
(ii) We have xi+(sk, sl + q2, y
i
l) < x
i(sk, 0). This implies, by Lemma 21(iii),
yil < x
i(sl + q2, 0). With the definition of yil, we arrive at y
i
l = max{xˆi(sl + q2), cl}.
Q.e.d.
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Proof of Theorem 10. First statement: it remains to prove that ck ≤ x˘ik (k ∈ K , i ∈Ck), which we do by contradiction. So suppose there exist k ∈ K and i ∈ Ck for
which ck > x˘ik. Noting that x˘
i
k ≤ xi(sk, 0), two cases obtain:
• x˘ik = xi(sk, 0).
So we now have ck > x˘ik = x
i(sk, 0) ≥ xˆi(sk). This implies
vi(ni; nıˆ) = ui(ck, sk) < ui(xi(sk, 0), sk) = ui(xˆi(0), 0)) ≤ vi(xˆi(0); nıˆ),
a contradiction.
• x˘ik < xi(sk, 0).
Fix l ∈ {0, . . . , k−1} for which x˘ik = xi+(sk, sl +q2, yil). Then, by Lemma 24(ii),
yil = max{xˆi(sl+q2), cl}. So we now have xˆi(sk) ≤ xi+(sk, sl + q2, yil) < ck and
xi+(sk, sl + q2, y
i
l) < x
i(sk, 0). This implies
vi(ni; nıˆ) = ui(ck, sk) < ui(xi+(sk, sl + q2, y
i
l), sk) = u
i(yil, sl + q2)
= ui(max{xˆi(sl + q2), cl}, sl + q2).
In case max{xˆi(sl+q2), cl} = xˆi(sl+q2), we obtain, noting that Fnıˆ(xˆi(sl+q2)) ≥
sl + q2,
vi(ni; nıˆ) < ui(xˆi(sl + q2), sl + q2) ≤ ui(xˆi(sl + q2), Fnıˆ(xˆi(sl + q2)))
= vi(xˆi(sl + q2); nıˆ),
a contradiction.
And in case max{xˆi(sl + q2), cl} = cl, we obtain, noting that Fnıˆ(cl) ≥ sl + q2,
vi(ni; nıˆ) < ui(cl, sl + q2) ≤ ui(cl, Fnıˆ(cl) = vi(cl; nıˆ),
also a contradiction.
Second statement: by contradiction. So suppose there are k ∈ K , j with
1 ≤ j < k, and i ∈ C j such that ck < xi+(sk, s j, c j). Because also c j < xi+(sk, s j, c j)
and, by Lemma 21(ii), xˆi(sk) < x
i
+(sk, s j, c j), two cases obtain:
• c j ≤ xˆi(sk) < xi+(sk, s j, c j).
If ck ≥ xˆi(sk), then xˆi(sk) ≤ ck < xi+(sk, s j, c j), and it follows thatvi(ni; nıˆ) =
ui(c j, s j) = ui(x
i
+(sk, s j, c j), sk) < u
i(ck, sk) = ui(ck, Fnıˆ(ck)) = vi(ck; nıˆ), a
contradiction.
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• xˆi(sk) < c j < xi+(sk, s j, c j).
Then xˆi(sk) < c j < ck < x
i(sk, s j, c j), and it follows that vi(ni; nıˆ) = ui(c j, s j) =
ui(xi+(sk, s j, c j), sk) < u
i(ck; sk) = ui(ck, Fnıˆ(ck)) = vi(ck; nıˆ), a contradiction.
Q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 11. It may be good to note that we assumed that c is strictly in-
creasing, but that this also follows from the second condition. Indeed, from this con-
dition (with j = k−1) and Lemma 21(ii), we have for k ≥ 2, ck ≥ xi+(sk, sk−1, ck−1) >
ck−1.
Now, because ck ≤ x˘ik(c) ≤ Li, there exists a unique K-level multi-action
n ∈ X. It remains to show that n is a Nash-equilibrium. Therefore, fix i and, with
k ∈ K such that i ∈ Ck, xi ∈ Xi with xi , ck. We must prove that ui(xi, Fnıˆ(xi)) ≤
ui(ck, sk).
• Case xi < ck. Let l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} be such that cl ≤ xi < cl+1. By Lemma 23
above, we have
Fnıˆ(xi) = sl + q2.
Because
cl ≤ xˆi(sl + q2) ⇒ yil = xˆi(sl + q2),
xˆi(sl + q2) < cl < x
i(sl + q2, 0) ⇒ yil = cl,
xi(sl + q2, 0) ≤ cl ⇒ yil = xi(sl + q2, 0),
we have
ui(xi, sl + q2) ≤ ui(yil, sl + q2).
Using this and noting that xi+(sk, sl + q2, y
i
l) ≥ xˆi(sk), we obtain
ui(xi, Fnıˆ(xi)) = ui(xi, sl + q2) ≤ ui(yil, sl + q2) = ui(xi+(sk, sl + q2, yil), sk)
≤ ui(min
0≤ j<k
xi+(sk, s j + q2, y
i
j), sk) = u
i(x˘ik(c), sk) ≤ ui(ck, sk).
• Case xi > ck. Let l ∈ {k, . . . ,K} be such that, with cK+1 := ∞, cl ≤ xi < cl+1.
By Lemma 23 above, we have Fnıˆ(xi) = sl. Also, by the second condition,
xˆi(sl) ≤ xi+(sl, sk, ck) ≤ cl ≤ xi.
We now obtain
ui(xi, Fnıˆ(xi)) = ui(xi, sl) ≤ ui(xi+(sl, sk, ck), sl) = ui(ck, sk). Q.e.d.
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Lemma 25 xi(sk, sk−1 + q2) ≤ x˘ik ≤ xi(sk, 0). 
Proof.— Since x˘ik ∈ V isk , the second inequality holds. Now take l ∈ {0, . . . , k−1} for
which x˘ik = x
i
+(sk, sl + q2, y
i
l). Because y
i
l ≥ xˆi(sl + q2) and xi+ is strictly increasing
in its third variable and xi is strictly decreasing in its second variable, we obtain
x˘ik ≥ xi+(sk, sl + q2, xˆi(sl + q2)) = xi(sk, sl + q2) ≥ xi(sk, sk−1 + q2),
as desired. Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 13. First note that the M − 1 strict inequalities (12) imply
xˆk(s) < xk(s, 0) < xˆl(s) < xl(s, 0) (k, l ∈ M with k < l and s ∈ Q++). (13)
Now suppose n ∈ EC. Then n is a multi-action with cluster partition C. Let
c1 < · · · < cM be the level data of n. Then, by Theorem 11,
ck ∈ [xˆk(sk), x˘k(c)] ⊆ [xˆk(sk), xk+(sk, sk−1 + q2, yk,k−1)].
(Noting that yij does not depend on the particular i ∈ Ck, we write yk j.) Because
yk,k−1 = max{xˆk(sk−1 + q2),min{ck−1, xk(sk−1 + q2, 0)}}
and, with (13),
ck−1 ≤ xk−1(sk−1, 0) < xk−1(sk−1 + q2, 0) < xˆk(sk−1 + q2) < xk(sk−1 + q2, 0),
we have
yk,k−1 = xˆk(sk−1 + q2).
Because xk+(sk, sk−1 + q2, xˆk(sk−1 + 1N−1 )) = xk(sk, sk−1 + q2), we find, as desired,
ck ∈ [xˆk(sk), xk(sk, sk−1 + q2)] (k ∈ M).
Now let n be a multi-action with cluster partition C and level data c1 <
· · · < cM such that ck ∈ [xˆk(sk), xk(sk, sk−1 + q2)] (k ∈ M). We prove that n ∈ EC by
showing that c1, . . . , cM satisfy the two conditions of Theorem 11. So fix k ∈ K .
Because, by Lemma 25 just above, xi(sk, sk−1+q2) ≤ x˘ik(c), the first condition
is met. Next, we show that the second condition of Theorem 11 is met. For 1 ≤ j ≤
k, we have (using Lemma 21(iii))
x j+(sk, s j, c j) ≤ x j+(sk, s j, x j(s j, s j−1 + q2)) = x j(sk, s j + q2)
≤ x j(sk, 0) ≤ xˆk(sk) ≤ ck,
as desired. Q.e.d.
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Lemma 26 Suppose C and C′ are two K-dimensional ordered partitions ofN with
the same clusters. Let λ : N → K and λ′ : N → K be the label functions of C and
C′. Then there exist a, b ∈ N with
λ(a) < λ(b), λ′(a) = λ(b), λ′(b) < λ(b). 
Proof.— Let pi be the permutation of K = {1, . . . ,K} such that C′k = Cpi(k) (k ∈ K).
Then λ = pi ◦ λ′. Now let A be a subset of N with K elements such that {λ′(n) | n ∈
A} = K . Because pi is a permutation ofK , we also have {λ(n) | n ∈ A} = K . Now let
µ := λ  A (i.e. the restriction of λ to A) and µ′ := λ′  A. Then µ, µ′ : A → K are
bijections and τ := µ′ ◦ µ−1 : K → K is well-defined and a permutation. Because
C , C′, we have λ , λ′ and even µ , µ′. (Indeed, if µ = µ′, then we would
have λ = λ′. To see this, for i ∈ N , let n ∈ A be such that λ′(n) = λ′(i). Then
λ′(i) = λ′(n) = µ′(n) = µ(n) = λ(n) = pi(λ′(n)) = pi(λ′(i)) = λ(i).) Because τ , id,
the number
r := max{ j ∈ K | τ( j) , j} = max{ j ∈ K | τ−1( j) , j}
is well-defined. Now take a := µ′−1(r), b := µ−1(r). Then µ′(a) = r = µ(b). So also
λ′(a) = r = λ(b).
Because τ(r) , r, it follows that a , b. Now µ(a) > r would imply r = µ′(a) =
τ(µ(a)) = µ(a) > r, so µ(a) ≤ r = µ(b). Because a , b, we obtain µ(a) < µ(b) and
thus also
λ(a) < λ(b).
Similarly, µ′(b) > r would imply r = µ(b) = τ−1(µ′(b)) = µ′(b) > r, so µ′(b) ≤ r =
µ(b) = µ′(a). Because a , b, we obtain µ′(b) < µ(b) and thus also
λ′(b) < λ(b). Q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 15. LetH be such as in Proposition 13.
Second statement: there exists k ∈ M such that #Hk ≥ 2. For such a
k, it holds sk < sk−1 + q2 and, therefore, xˆk(sk) < xk(sk, sk−1 + q2). Now apply
Proposition 13.
Third statement: here #Hk = 1 for all k, therefore, sk = sk−1 + q2. Now
apply Proposition 13.
First statement: we prove by contradiction that for each ordered partition
C′ = (C′1, . . . ,C′M) of N with C′ , H such that each C′k is a homogeneity class,
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it holds EC′ = ∅; so E(M) = EH . So suppose EC′ , ∅. Let λ and λ′ be the label
functions of H and C′. Applying Lemma 26 to H and C′ with K = M, there exist
i, j ∈ N with
λ(i) < λ( j), λ′(i) = λ( j), λ′( j) < λ( j).
Define k := λ(i), l := λ( j), and r := λ′( j). Using accents for the relevant notations
for C′ and noting that C′l = Hk and C′r = Hl, we have
x′+l = x+k, x
′
+r = x+l
(similar outcomes for xˆ and x). Now, let c′1 < · · · < c′M be the level data of some
element of EC′ . Then, according to result (1),
c′r ∈ [xˆl(s′r), xl(s′r, s′r−1 + q2)], c′l ∈ [xˆk(s′l), xk(s′l , s′l−1 + q2)].
Moreover, from Theorem 10,
c′l ≥ x+l(s′l , s′r, c′r).
It follows that
c′l ≥ x+l(s′l , s′r, c′r) ≥ x+l(s′l , s′r, xˆl(s′r)) = xl(s′l , s′r) > xˆl(s′l).
But, since xk(s, 0) < xˆl(s) < xl(s, 0) for s ∈ Q++ by assumption and noting that
s′l > 0, we also have
c′l ≤ xk(s′l , s′l−1 + q2) ≤ xk(s′l , 0) < xˆl(s′l).
This is a contradiction. Q.e.d.
Lemma 27 Suppose C = (C1, . . . ,CK) is a K-dimensional ordered partition of N
with an increasing label function λ : N → K . Then sλ( j) ≥ q j ( j ∈ N). 
Proof.— First we note that
∑λ( j)
l=1 #Cl ≥ j ( j ∈ N). Indeed,
∑λ( j)
l=1 #Cl is the number
of elements of the set A := C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cλ( j). Because j ∈ Cλ( j), we have j ∈ A.
Because λ is increasing, even {1, . . . , j} ∈ A. Thus this number is at least j. Now
sλ( j) = qΣλ( j)l=1 #Cl ≥ q j ( j ∈ N). Q.e.d.
Lemma 28 If a ∈ X is such that s j(a) ≥ q j ( j ∈ N), then
(i) a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ aN;
(ii) if 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1: s j(a) = q j or a j+1 = a j. 
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Proof.— (i) Let G := { j ∈ N| there is i < j with ai > a j}. Suppose G , ∅. Let
p := maxG and let i < p be such that ai > ap. We first prove
ap ≤ ap+1 ≤ · · · ≤ aN .
Well, if it does not hold, then there exists j ∈ {p, p + 1, . . . ,N − 1} with a j+1 < a j,
which implies j + 1 ∈ G. But then j + 1 > p, which contradicts p = maxG. Also
ap , ap+1, because otherwise ai > ap+1 and then p + 1 ∈ G, which again contradicts
p = maxG. So we now have ap < ap+1 ≤ ap+2 ≤ · · · ≤ aN and ai > ap with i < p.
Thus at most p − 1 players have an action that is lower or equal than ap. Therefore,
sp(a) ≤ qp−1, which is a contradiction. Conclusion: G = ∅.
Because G = ∅, there is no j for which there is i < j with ai > a j. Then for
all j and all i < j we have ai ≤ a j and therefore a1 ≤ · · · ≤ aN .
(ii) Suppose s j(a) , q j. Then s j(a) > q j. This implies a j = a j+1, because
otherwise, by (i), a j < a j+1 and then a1 ≤ · · · ≤ a j < a j+1 ≤ · · · ≤ aN and so
s j(a) = q j. Q.e.d.
Lemma 29 Suppose C = (C1, . . . ,CK) is a K-dimensional ordered partition of N
with an increasing label function λ : N → K . If a ∈ X is such that s j(a) ≥ sλ( j) ( j ∈
N), then
(i) a1 ≤ · · · ≤ aN;
(ii) if j ≤ N − 1: s j(a) = sλ( j) or a j = a j+1. 
Proof.— (i) By Lemmas 27 and 28(i) above.
(ii) Suppose s j(a) , sλ( j). Then s j(a) > sλ( j). This implies a j = a j+1, because
otherwise, by (i), a j < a j+1 and then a1 ≤ · · · ≤ a j < a j+1 ≤ · · · ≤ aN and so, with
Lemma 27, s j(a) = q j ≤ sλ( j). Q.e.d.
Lemma 30 Suppose C = (C1, . . . ,CK) is a K-dimensional ordered partition of N
with an increasing label function λ : N → K . Suppose n, a ∈ X are such that for
all i ∈ N
ni = xˆi(sλ(i)), si(n) = sλ(i), and vi(a) ≥ vi(n).
Then, for each i ∈ N:
1. si(a) ≥ sλ(i).
2. si(a) > sλ(i) or [si(a) = sλ(i) and ai = ni].
3. a1 ≤ · · · ≤ aN and n1 ≤ · · · ≤ nN .
4. if i ≤ N − 1: si(a) = sλ(i) or ai = ai+1.
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5. if i ≤ N − 1: ai = ni or ai = ai+1.
6. ai ≥ ni. 
Proof.— 1. ui(ai, si(a)) = vi(a) ≥ vi(n) = ui(ni, sλ(i)) = ui(xˆi(sλ(i)), sλ(i)) ≥ ui(ai, sλ(i)),
which implies si(a) ≥ sλ(i).
2. Suppose si(a) ≤ sλ(i). By 1, si(a) = sλ(i). If ai , ni, then vi(a) =
ui(ai, sλ(i)) < ui(xˆi(sλ(i)), sλ(i)) = vi(n) – a contradiction. So ai = ni.
3. By 1 and Lemma 29(i) above.
4. By Lemma 29(ii) above.
5. By 2 and 4.
6. From 1, sN(a) ≥ sK = qN , so sN(a) = sλ(N). Also, by 2, aN = nN . Now
suppose nk ≤ ak holds for some k ∈ K with 2 ≤ k ≤ N. This implies nk−1 ≤ ak−1.
Indeed, by 5 and 3, ak−1 = nk−1 or ak−1 = ak ≥ nk ≥ nk−1. Hence, the desired result
follows by induction. Q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 16. With λ : N → K the label function of (C1, . . . ,CK), we
have for all i ∈ N
ni = cλ(i) = xˆi(sλ(i)) and si(n) = sλ(i). (14)
Because n is a Nash equilibrium, Theorem 10 can be applied. So we know that,
for each k ∈ K , ck ≥ xi+(sk, s j, c j) (1 ≤ j < k, i ∈ C j). Noting that xi+(sk, s j, c j) =
xi+(sk, s j, xˆ
i(s j)) = x
i(sk, s j), we have for each k ∈ K , 1 ≤ j < k, and i ∈ C j
ck ≥ xi(sk, s j). (15)
Now suppose, without loss of generality, that the label function λ is increas-
ing. Let a ∈ X be a multi-action such that for all i ∈ N , vi(a) ≥ vi(n). The proof
is complete if we can show that, for all i ∈ N , vi(a) ≤ vi(n). Noting (14), we can
apply the above Lemma 30.
According to Lemma 30(2), we have two cases for i ∈ N :
• Case ai = ni and si(a) = sλ(i). Then (even) vi(a) = ui(ai, si(a)) = ui(ni, sλ(i)) =
vi(n).
• Case si(a) > sλ(i). Then i ≤ N−1. Noting that, by Lemma 30(1), sN(a) = sλ(N),
let p ≥ i with p < N be such that sl(a) > sλ(l) (i ≤ l ≤ p) and sp+1(a) = sλ(p+1).
Then Lemma 30(4) implies ai = ai+1 = · · · = ap+1, so
si(a) = sλ(p+1).
With (15) and Lemma 30(6), it follows that
xˆi(sλ(p+1)) ≤ xi(sλ(p+1), sλ(i)) ≤ cλ(p+1) = np+1 ≤ ap+1.
Using this, we arrive at
vi(a) = ui(ai, si(a)) = ui(ap+1, sλ(p+1))
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≤ ui(xi(sλ(p+1), sλ(i)), sλ(p+1))
= ui(xˆi(sλ(i)), sλ(i)) = ui(ni, si(n)) = vi(n). Q.e.d.
Lemma 31 Suppose d is a K-level multi-action with cluster partition C and level
data c1 < · · · < cK such that ck ≥ maxi∈Ck xˆi(sk) (k ∈ K). Then for all x with cluster
partition C and with x > d, d is a Pareto improvement of x. 
Proof.— Denote by λ : N → K the label function of C. Let c = (c1, . . . , cK)
be the level data of d and c′ = (c′1, . . . , c
′
K) those of x. Because x > d, it holds
c′ > c. Because both d and x have cluster partition C, si(d) = si(x) = sλ(i). So
we have vi(x) = ui(c′λ(i), sλ(i)) and v
i(d) = ui(cλ(i), sλ(i)). Noting that c′λ(i) ≥ cλ(i) ≥
max j∈Cλ(i) xˆ
j(sλ(i)) ≥ xˆi(sλ(i)), the inequalities vi(x) ≤ vi(d) (i ∈ N) follow. Now,
since c′ > c, let l ∈ K be such that c′l > cl. Then for each i with λ(i) = l,
c′λ(i) > cλ(i) ≥ xˆi(sλ(i)) holds and therefore vi(x) < vi(d). This implies the desired
result. Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 18. First statement: follows from Lemma 31 above.
Second statement: also follows from Lemma 31 above by noting that, with
d = x∗, if n , d then n > d.
Third statement: this follows from Theorem 16 if K = M. As for K < M,
take l ∈ CK such that cK := maxi∈CK xˆi(sK) = xˆl(sK) (= xˆl(1)). Then x∗l = xˆl(1) and
x∗l ≥ x∗ j ( j ∈ N). So vl(x∗) = ul(xˆl(1), 1), which implies that x∗ is weakly Pareto
efficient. That x∗ may not be strongly efficient is discussed in the text. Q.e.d.
B Addendum to footnote 10
Below we always consider a status game as in Definition 1, with or without property
(5), but with status production function
Si(x) := (1 − θ)#{ j ∈ N \ {i} | x
j ≤ xi}
N − 1 + θ
#{ j ∈ N \ {i} | x j < xi}
N − 1 ,
where 0 < θ ≤ 1 and ui : Xi × [0, 1]→ R.
For z ∈ Xıˆ, define the conditional status production function Siz : Xi → R
by
Siz(x
i) := Si(xi; z).
Now three fundamental remarks are:
• Each Siz is a step function.
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• For each z ∈ Xıˆ, the set of discontinuity points of the function Siz : Xi →
R is a subset of [0, Li] ∩ {z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zN} and the set of its interior
discontinuity points equals (0, Li) ∩ {z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zN}.
• Siz is not upper semi continuous in its interior discontinuity points.
• Each conditional payoff function viz has the same set of discontinuity points
as the function Siz.
Theorem 32 For each interior Nash equilibrium n one has #{n1, . . . , nN} = N. 
Proof.—By contradiction. So suppose n ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium and #{n1, . . . , nN}
, N. Let i, j ∈ N with i , j and ni = n j. Consider the conditional payoff function
vinıˆ : X
i → R. We derive a contradiction by proving that ni is not a maximiser of
this function. Write σi := Siz. Because n is interior, ni, and thus n j too, is an ele-
ment of the interior of Xi. Thus we have ni, n j ∈ (0, Li)∩ {n1, . . . , ni−1, ni+1, . . . , nN}.
Therefore ni is an interior discontinuity point of σi. Because σi is not upper semi
continuous in ni and σi is increasing, this implies that
σi(ni) < lim
h↓ni
σi(h) =: σi+(n
i).
Note that σi+(n
i) ∈ [0, 1]. Let  := ui(ni, σi+(ni)) − ui(ni, σi(ni)). We have  > 0.
Because ui(·, σi+(ni)) is (lower semi) continuous in ni, there exists a ∈ Xi with a > ni
and ui(a, σi+(n
i)) > ui(ni, σi+(n
i)) − , i.e. with
ui(a, σi+(n
i)) > ui(ni, σi(ni)).
Noting that σi(a) ≥ σi+(ni) > σi(ni), we obtain
vinıˆ(a) = v
i(a, σi(a)) ≥ ui(a, σi+(ni)) > ui(ni, σi(ni)) = vinıˆ(ni),
as desired. Q.e.d.
Let s ∈ [0, 1]. Because the function ui(·, s) : Xi → R is a continuous
and strictly quasi-concave on a non-empty compact subset of R, it has a unique
maximiser that we denote by
xˆi(s).
Theorem 33 Suppose that each function xˆi : [0, 1] → R is constant and that
#{xˆ1, . . . , xˆN} < N. Then there is no interior Nash equilibrium. 
Proof.— First we prove by contradiction that there does not exist a N-level Nash
equilibrium. So suppose n is a N-level Nash equilibrium. Then, using the same
reasoning as in Proposition 6, n = (xˆ1, · · · , xˆN). But now n is not a N-level multi-
action, which is a contradiction. This and Theorem 32 implies that there is no
interior Nash equilibrium. Q.e.d.
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